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A public health response to drug offenses has potential to improve both public 
safety and public health.  However, the public’s desire for retribution represents a 
possible hindrance to reform.  Relying on dual-process theory of moral decision-making, 
this dissertation examines agreement among laypeople about the relative blame 
deserved for various crime types, and probes several possible predictors of support—
the need for cognition (“NFC”), intergroup bias, and free-will doubt—for retributive as 
well as consequentialist responses to crime.  Findings from several web-based 
experiments show: (a) in comparison to core crimes (eg., murder) substantially less 
agreement about the relative blame deserved for noncore crimes (eg., drug offenses); 
(b) high NFC is associated with greater support for consequentialist responses to crime; 
and (c) free-will doubt is associated with less support for retribution, with blame 
mediating the relationship.  Overall, it suggests high variability in decisions about 
noncore crimes, and possible ways to facilitate a switch in support from punishment to 
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“Civilization is built upon the renunciation of instinct.”  
–Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States has a punishment problem.  From 1972 to 2007, the rate of 
incarceration rose 4-fold from 161 of every 100,000 residents in prison and jail to a peak 
of 767 of every 100,000—a rate historically and internationally unrivaled (Travis, 
Western, & Redburn, 2014).  The “war on drugs,” which led to an unprecedented rate of 
drug-related convictions, has played an outsized role (Travis, et al., 2014; Thompson, 
2010).   By 1997, drug-related offenders comprised one-fifth of all state prison inmates 
and nearly two-thirds of all federal inmates (Mumola & Karberg, 2006), and since then 
the proportions have remained stable (Carson, 2015).  This increase reflected a change 
of purpose in punishment policy: away from rehabilitating offenders and towards 
satisfying the public’s urge for retribution.  As a report by the National Academy of 
Sciences concluded, the public’s desire for retribution was one of the main if not the 
only “impulses” behind the codification of harsh policies and consequent rise in 
incarceration rates. (Travis et al., 2014).   
Efforts are now underway to shift the emphasis of criminal-justice policy away 
from punishment towards rehabilitation (Fondacaro, Koppel, O'Toole, & Crain, 2015).  
For non-violent drug offenses, this has involved an attempt to recast such behavior as a 
problem of public health.  From this perspective, drug-seeking behavior is not the 
product of bad choices but instead changes in the brain (Chandler, Fletcher, & Volkow, 
2009).  For drug policy, several implications follow from this understanding of non-
violent drug crime.  First, retributive punishment based on moral blame is not justified; 
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after all, a person cannot be regarded as morally responsible for actions outside his or 
her control.  Second, punishment alone is unlikely to be effective; as the value of a 
drug’s reward grows, drug addicts become insensitive to its deterrent effects (Volkow, 
Baler, & Goldstein, 2011).  Finally, the opportunity costs of a retributive approach to 
drug abuse are high.  Although an estimated one-half of all prisoners meet the criteria 
for drug abuse or dependence (Karberg & James, 2005; Mumola & Karberg, 2006), only 
one-fifth of prisoners receive empirically supported drug treatment (Karberg, et al., 
2005; Mumola et al., 2006).  By point of contrast, in Portugal where drug use is 
decriminalized and such treatment is readily available, the rate of drug mortality is one-
fiftieth that of the U.S.—achieving the same rate in the U.S. would save 1 life every 10 
minutes (Kristof, 2017). 
The public health approach to drug policy, which argues against punishment in 
favor of treatment, has promise to reduce incarceration and expand access to 
rehabilitative alternatives.  However, its success depends on the public’s willingness to 
resist the urge for retribution against drug use.  As proponents of a public health 
approach to drug policy point out, this may be the biggest hurdle to reform: the 
perception of drug abuse as a moral failing that deserves punishment (Volkow & Li, 
2004).  Yet as science advances our understanding of addiction, these views are apt to 
be questioned.  Nora Volkow, the Director of the National Institute of Addiction, sees the 
problem this way: “As we understand the neurobiological substrates that underlie 
voluntary actions, how will society define the boundaries of personal responsibility in 
those individuals who have impairments in these brain circuits?” (Volkow et al., 2004).   
From the perspective of the psychology of punishment, this inquiry raises several 
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empirically testable questions: (1) What drives judgments about punishment? (2) Are 
such judgments about drug crime different?  (3) Are there individual differences that 
account for attitudes toward punishment? (4) What other factors might affect them?   
Dual-process theory of moral decision-making provides a framework for 
examining such questions.  The idea for dual-process theory grew out of an attempt to 
solve an ethical puzzle known as the trolley problem which runs as follows.  Imagine a 
trolley is careening toward five people standing on a track, and you are a bystander with 
the options to: (1) flip a switch that turns the trolley away from the track and onto 
another with just one person on it, killing one to save five (the switch scenario); (2) push 
a person off a footbridge onto the track, accomplishing the same (the footbridge 
scenario).  Asked what they would do, a majority of people indicate support for flipping 
the switch, but not pushing the person off the footbridge, that is, people tend to be 
consequentialists (5 lives > 1 life) in the switch scenario, and deontologists (“thou shall 
not kill”) in the footbridge scenario (Greene et al., 2001; Cushman, Young & Hauser, 
2006).  What’s going on?  
Dual-process theory suggests the answer lies in the structure of the brain.  
According to the theory, the tension between consequentialism and deontology which 
the trolley problem lays bare reflects a similar tension between two competing and 
distinct cognitive systems: automatic and manual mode (Greene, J. D., 2014).   Joshua 
Greene, dual-process theory’s leading proponent, analogizes this design structure to 
that of a digital camera.  Such cameras come with two complementary picture-taking 
modes, automatic and manual.  For most situations, the camera’s automatic mode 
settings (eg., portrait, landscape, sunset) work well; however, others call for the use of a 
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manual mode, enabling a user to tailor its settings to a particular circumstance.  This 
dual-track design allows for both efficient and flexible decision-making.  So it is with 
moral judgments, according to dual-process process theory, which argues that such 
decisions arise from both automatic, emotional responses (automatic mode) and 
controlled, conscious reasoning (manual mode).   
Some may shrug off the claim that moral judgments proceed along dual 
psychological tracks as uninteresting, since the dominant view in cognitive science is 
that the mind is comprised of two distinct systems of thought, system 1 (automatic), and 
system 2 (controlled) (Evans, J. S. B., 2003); after all, moral judgments are also outputs 
of the mind.  But dual-process theory goes beyond this claim to predict that the two 
cognitive systems tend toward two distinct kinds of moral judgments.  Specifically, it 
posits that reasoning in automatic mode favors deontological judgments, whereas 
reasoning in the more controlled manual mode favors consequentialist judgments 
(Greene, J. D., 2014).  In the brain’s court Kant and Bentham argue their cases—and 
winning may well turn on the mode of moral reasoning a person happens to be in.   
Empirical studies consistent with dual-process theory suggest several answers to 
the questions posed above.  Research shows that (1) moral judgments about how to 
respond to wrongdoing are rooted in shared instincts that favor retributive punishment 
(Robinson & Kurzban, 2006; Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002; Aharoni & Fridlund, 
2012); (2) that people who rely less on controlled cognition tend to be more retributive 
(Sargent, M. J., 2004); (3) that emotional responses to out-groups play a role in support 
for retributive policies (Cunningham et al., 2004; Hetey & Eberhardt, 2014); and (4) that 
damping folk intuitions about free-will decreases support for retributive punishment 
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(Atiq, 2013; Haynes, Rojas, & Viney, 2003; Shariff et al., 2014).  Viewed together, these 
findings suggest several automatic default settings that fuel harsh punishment: (1) low 
‘need for cognition,’ (2) out-group bias, and (3) folk intuitions about free-will.  
Conversely, they suggest several potential switches from automatic to manual mode, 
that is, from deontological judgments that favor backward-oriented punishment to 
consequentialist judgments that favor forward-oriented rehabilitation—such as a public 
health approach to drug policy. 
For the purpose of understanding punishment of drug crime, though, these 
findings should be viewed cautiously, since previous research has focused almost 
exclusively on core wrongdoing: physical aggression, unconsented-to takings, and 
deception or deceit in exchanges (Robinson & Kurzban, 2006).  According to Robinson 
and Kurzban, two leading researchers of the psychology of punishment, such wrongs 
may be so central to effective group cooperation that our responses to them are deeply 
intuitive and widely shared.  But for non-core crimes—those falling outside the core 
such as drug use—our intuitions may be less ingrained, and hence more susceptible to 
influence by these various factors (Robinson, Kurzban, & Jones, 2007).  Do the factors 
above also affect judgments about non-core drug crimes?  What is their impact relative 
to core crime?   
The present dissertation addresses these questions through a series of studies.  
Study (1) examines lay attitudes about punishment of “core” and “non-core” crime;  
study (2) the relationship between the need for cognition and judgments about how to 
respond to crime; study (3) the relationship between perceived racial disparities and 
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judgments about how to respond to crime; and study (4) the relationship between belief 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Retributive Approach to Drug Policy 
What has been the criminal justice system’s response to the problem of drug abuse?  
Since the principal function of criminal justice is to dispense punishment, it is no 
surprise that punishment has been favored over public health.  Starting in the 1980s, at 
both the national and state level, drug policy makers waged a muscular “war” on drugs 
with the aim of redressing the problem through imprisonment.  The shift in crime policy 
during this time was dramatic, ushering in “some of the most extensive changes” in 
criminal justice policy since the due process revolution of the 1960s.” (Jensen, & 
Gerber, 1996).  
Predictably, the prosecution of the war on drugs resulted in a sharp increase in 
drug-related convictions (Jensen, Gerber, & Mosher, 2004; Travis, Western & Redburn, 
2014; Thompson, 2010).  By 1997, the proportion of drug-related offenders reached 
one-fifth of all state prison inmates and nearly two-thirds of all federal inmates (Mumola 
& Karberg, 2006), and since then has remained roughly the same (Carson, 2015).  
Moreover, the impact has been skewed: while the prevalence of drug use is only slightly 
higher among blacks than among whites for some illicit drugs, and slightly lower for 
other illicit drugs, the rate of arrest for drug-related offenses has been 3 to 4 times 
higher among blacks (Travis, Western, & Redburn, 2014).  In the late 1980s alone, the 
rate of arrest for drug-related offenses was 6 times higher among blacks (Blumstein & 
Wallman, 2006).   
It’s worth noting, however, that the extent to which the war on drugs has 
contributed to growth in incarceration is debatable.  John Pfaff, a leading opponent of 
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this view, finds that drug offenses have not directly contributed much to prison growth, 
chiefly because convicted drug offenders are often not incarcerated (Pfaff, 2012).  Yet 
even Pfaff concedes that the war on drugs may have played an important role, albeit 
indirectly.   For example, he contends that many people incarcerated for property or 
violent crimes might have received probation had they not been previously arrested on 
a drug crime charge (Pfaff, 2012). 
2.2 Public Health Approach to Drug Policy 
The public health approach to drug policy aims to address the broad individual, 
environmental, and societal factors that influence drug abuse.  This approach is partly 
based on a burgeoning understanding of the neuroscience of addiction.  According to a 
recent Surgeon General report on alcohol, drug, and health, among the chief reasons 
for adopting a public health orientation to drug policy is the clear evidence 
demonstrating that: “substance use has complex biological and social determinants, 
and substance use disorders are medical conditions involving disruption of key brain 
circuits.” (Mental, H. S. A. U., & Office of the Surgeon General, US, 2016). 
Broadly speaking, a group of four brain functions have been shown to underlie 
addiction: (1) reward, (2) motivation, (3) memory, and (4) control (Volkow, Fowler, & 
Wang, 2003).  Research suggests that this group works like a government that, under 
normal circumstances, cooperates, learns, and changes together, and has various built-
in checks and balances to optimize functioning.  Each part plays a distinct role.  Reward 
is involved in assigning values to positive and negative stimuli.  Motivation is involved in 
incentive motivation.  Memory is involved in general learning via association and 
conditioning.  Located in the prefrontal cortex, control works like the brain’s judge, 
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resolving disputes among the various members.  For individuals with drug addiction, the 
balance among the group is lost.  As a result, the increased weight of a drug in the 
areas of reward, motivation/drive, and memory, prove too powerful for the prefrontal 
cortex to inhibit.  This sets a viscous cycle into motion, with drug use leading to higher 
drug value and less inhibitory control, which begets more drug use, higher drug value, 
and less inhibitory control.  And so on.   
This neuroanatomical understanding of addiction is supported by research on the 
neurochemistry of the addicted brain.  Studies of the neurochemistry of addiction focus 
on the brain’s dopamine system, for drugs of abuse are posited to exert most of their 
influence via dopamine reinforcement (Volkow, et al., 2003).  The reinforcing effects of 
drugs via the dopamine system is potent, even more so than natural reinforcers like sex 
and food (Volkow, et al., 2003).  Imaging studies have revealed that acute and chronic 
drug consumption have different effects on proteins involved in dopamine synaptic 
transmission: in the short run, drug administration increases dopamine transmission; in 
the long run, drug administration decreases dopamine transmission (Volkow et al., 
2007).  Fmri studies of the effects of various drugs, including cocaine, 
methamphetamine, alcohol, and heroin, show a marked reduction in dopamine 2 
receptors.  This is the result of a process known as receptor down-regulation, whereby 
a surfeit of transmitter molecules floods a receptor, and in response the number of 
receptors decreases.  This process is one of the explanations of drug tolerance: as the 
number of receptors decreases, the post-synaptic neuron becomes desensitized, 
thereby increasing the amount of a drug needed to achieve the same effect.  Further 
support comes from animal studies showing that an increase in dopamine 2 receptors in 
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the nucleus accumbens has the opposite effect—a significant reduction in drug 
consumption (Davis, Akera, & Brody, 1979). 
Consistent with this understanding, a growing number of substance abuse 
treatments have proved successful in the criminal justice setting.  Cognitive behavioral 
therapy (“CBT”) is a form of talk therapy premised on the idea that patterns of thought 
play an important role in mental disease, such as substance use disorders, and that 
such patterns can be interrupted by adopting various coping strategies (Beck, 2011).  
Studies of CBT in criminal justice populations have shown it to be effective in both 
reducing recidivism (Landenberger & Lipsey, 2005) and substance abuse (Magill & Ray, 
2009).  Therapeutic community (“TC”) is an amalgam of treatment approaches 
distinguished mainly by (1) its understanding of substance abuse as having a broad 
range of biological, psychological, and sociological determinants, and (2) administration 
at the community level through one’s social environment, peers and staff members (De 
Leon, 1994).  Research on TCs shows moderate effects in criminal justice populations, 
with an average 13% reduction in recidivism relative to a comparison group (Pearson & 
Lipton, 1999).  Finally, medically-assisted treatment (“MAT”) involves the use of 
medication as a substitute for opiate-based drug addiction.  Several such FDA-
approved treatments exist, including methadone, a full agonist of the mμ opiate 
receptor; buprenorphine, a partial agonist of the mμ opiate receptor; and naltrexone, an 
antagonist of the mμ opiate receptor.  In a systematic meta-analysis of MATs, 
researchers found varying support: heroin maintenance was found to reduce crime 
significantly more than methadone maintenance; methadone maintenance was found to 
reduce crime more than treatments without substitution medication; Buprenorphine was 
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found to reduce crime more than placebo; and Naltrexone was found to reduce crime 
more than behavioral therapy and counseling (Egli et al., 2009).   
 Moreover, as problem-solving drug courts have proliferated—more than 2,500 
now operate throughout all 50 states—access to such evidence-based treatment has 
improved.  Premised on the idea of therapeutic jurisprudence, which argues for 
increasing the role of treatment in the law, such courts aim to reduce substance abuse 
and recidivism by diverting drug offenders away from incarceration and into treatment.  
Although punishment remains a possibility, its use in this context is tempered by an 
understanding of substance abuse as a disease in which relapse is likely.  Research on 
drug courts shows mixed success with estimates ranging from no effect on recidivism 
(Rossman et al., 2011) to a 15% reduction (Gottfredson, Najaka, & Kearley, 2003; 
Wilson, Mitchell, & MacKenzie, 2006).    
While the expansion of drug courts marks a positive shift away from punishment 
towards public health, several limitations should be noted.  First, the proportion of 
overall drug offenders diverted into a drug court remains low, with estimates suggesting 
just 1 out of every 30 drug offenders is admitted into one (Alliance, D.P., 2011).  
Second, access to certain types of evidence-based treatment is limited.  For example, in 
a recent nationwide study of drug courts, it was found that although 98% reported 
opioid-addicted defendants, only about one-half made MAT available (Matusow et al., 
2013).  Finally, despite their focus on delivering treatment, principles of retributive 
justice still figure prominently.  For instance, prosecutors often exclude certain 
categories of offenders whose crimes are deemed too “serious” to “deserve” eligibility 
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for diversion and treatment (Goldkamp, 2003)—a decision based not on the likelihood of 
success in treatment but on a retrospective judgment of conduct. 
As we have seen, evidence in support of the public health approach to drug 
policy, which views addiction as a medical problem rooted in brain-based changes, has 
potential to change perceptions about the right response to drug crimes, from a moral 
transgression deserving of retributive punishment to a public health problem in need of 
amelioration.  Still, one might argue that support for harsh drug crime penalties reflect 
our deep intuitions about punishment, intuitions unlikely to be swayed by science.  
However, the fact that non-violent drug crime is not considered “core” wrongdoing 
suggests that support for retribution against such crime may be less rigid than expected. 
2.3 Empirical Desert 
How do we make judgments about the appropriate punishment for wrongdoing?  A 
commonsense response to this question is apt to point to (1) a process of careful and 
deliberate reasoning, influenced by (2) the unique attributes of a decision-maker.  Yet 
research suggests that these factors play less of a role than one might expect.  
According to empirical desert theory, lay decisions about punishment for wrongdoing 
are rooted not in a process of deliberate reason but rather in snap intuitions shared 
widely across societies and demographic backgrounds (Robinson & Kurzban, 2006).   
Support for empirical desert theory comes mainly in the form of studies showing 
agreement among laypeople about the relative blame deserved for various criminal 
offenses; for example, a murderer deserves more punishment than a thief.   Rather than 
focusing on attitudes about the amount of punishment deserved for a crime—which can 
vary appreciably based on a community’s tolerance for harsh punishment—the theory 
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assumes that such comparative assessments are the best indication of a universal 
sense of justice, a moral grammar as it were.  For example, Robinson and Kurzban 
conducted a study of 64 participants who were given twenty-four short scenarios 
depicting “John” engaged in a criminal offense (Robinson & Kurzban, 2006).  
Participants were asked to rank-order the offenses based on the amount of punishment 
John deserves.  Scenarios involved offenses such as theft by taking, theft by fraud, 
property destruction, assault, burglary, robbery, kidnapping, rape, negligent homicide, 
manslaughter, murder and torture.  Kendall’s W coefficient of concordance was used to 
statistically analyze the results (Kendall’s W coefficients range from 0 to 1, with 0 
indicating no concordance and 1 indicating perfect concordance).  Described as an 
“astounding level of agreement,” Robinson and Kurzban found a Kendall’s W of .95 
(p=.001).  In a web-based follow up of the study, 246 participants were asked to perform 
a similar task, this time using a mouse to drag and order each scenario based on 
punishment deserved.  Again, participants showed a high level of concordance; a 
Kendall’s W of .88 (p=.001).   These findings have been confirmed by studies using 
other empirical methods, including tasks where participants were required to assign 
offense scenarios to one of a set of predetermined categories; studies where 
participants were asked to assign numerical values to a number of offense scenarios 
based on crime seriousness; and studies showing that laypeople tend to justify 
punishment based on retributive notions (Robinson et al., 2006).    
Moreover, the notion of shared intuitions of justice has support across various 
demographics.  For example, in a study where participants were asked to assign a 
prison sentence according to the seriousness of an offense, researchers found that 
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demographic factors—gender, race, religious affiliation, and level of education—had 
little influence on the ordering of sentencing (Blumstein & Cohen, 1980).  Cross-cultural 
studies have also shown similar consistency.  For example, Newman conducted a study 
of 2,360 individuals from various cultures chosen for their apparent differences—India, 
Indonesia, Iran, United States, and Yugoslavia—in which the participants were asked to 
rate serious offenses on a twelve-point scale.  Despite their cultural differences, on the 
question of relative criminal seriousness he found “general agreement in ranks across 
all countries.” (Morris, T., 1979).   Finally, even children have been found to have 
consistent views about relative punishment (Finkel, Liss, & Moran, 1997).   
What are the implications of these findings?  According to Robinson and 
Kurzban, they argue for establishing retribution in its “empirical” formulation as the basis 
of criminal justice policy—as opposed to deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation.  
Their case for apportioning punishment based on shared retributive “intuitions” rests, 
counterintuitively, on consequentialist grounds: (1) the need to satisfy the public’s 
purportedly universal retributive urges, and (2) potential crime-control effects.  Relying 
heavily on Tom Tyler’s seminal work (Tyler, 2006), with respect to crime-control 
Robinson argues that adherence to empirical deserts enhances the moral credibility of 
the law, and thereby decreases citizens’ desire to engage in vigilantism and other forms 
of non-compliance.   That is, when people perceive the law as being in line with their 
own intuitions about punishment, they are more likely to follow it.  It’s important to point 
out, however, that this proposition—that departure from consensus views on 
punishment is criminogenic—has yet to be well-established; in fact, recent research 
raises doubts about whether this is the case (Slobogin & Brinkley-Rubinstein, 2013).  
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Despite these findings, some commentators argue that evidence of “shared 
intuitions” of justice should be viewed skeptically for several reasons.  First, Kolber 
makes the case that empirical desert theory relies on “cherry-picked” intuitions (Kolber, 
2009).  Specifically, he argues that research supporting empirical desert theory is 
limited in that it focuses on a single level of abstraction: intuitions elicited via short 
vignettes containing few facts about a crime.  At this level, laypeople’s intuitions may 
well be driven by retributive urges.  However, when asked in even more abstract terms 
about the goals of criminal-justice punishment, laypeople tend to include aims like 
deterrence and incapacitation (Carlsmith, 2008).  Second, Slobogin points out that 
empirical desert research is focused primarily on “core” crimes, and posits that crimes 
outside the core may vary significantly (Slobogin, & Brinkley-Rubinstein, 2013).  Indeed, 
Robinson’s own research suggests this is so, finding “considerably less agreement” in 
rank-ordering of crimes such as marijuana and cocaine use and dealing, prostitution, 
underage drinking, and abortion (Robinson et al., 2006).  Slobogin encourages more 
research on this score, and suggests that, if there is no general agreement on such 
controversial criminal law topics, then empirical desert may not be of much use to policy 
makers (Slobogin, C., 2010).  Finally, Slobogin raises the possibility that dispositions 
guided by goals other than satisfying the public’s urge for punishment may, 
nevertheless, satisfy empirical desert’s aims (Slobogin, C., 2010).  For example, he 
suggests that intensive multi-systemic therapy—which has been shown to significantly 
reduce recidivism of violent juveniles (Henggeler, 1999)—may have enough “punitive 
bite” to achieve both the aims of rehabilitation and empirical desert. This notion that 
rehabilitative programs can satisfy retributive urges is supported by experimental 
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research.  Harlow, Darley and Robinson, for instance, found that participants in a study 
of community perceptions of punishment equated three years of an intensive 
supervision program with a year in prison in terms of punishment units (Harlow, Darley, 
& Robinson, 1995). 
As we have seen, consistent with dual-process theory, people the world over 
tend to have similar retributive urges in response to “core” crimes, that is, our automatic 
and intuitive responses to “core” crimes tend to favor backward-oriented retributive 
punishment.  According to some, such general agreement argues for predicating 
criminal justice policy on deontological judgments about wrongdoing, and cautions us 
against consequentialist reforms that fail to satisfy the public’s need for payback.  
However persuasive this argument may be with regard to “core” crime, this reasoning is 
less persuasive for non-“core” crime, for evidence of agreement on such crime remains 
inconclusive.  Research showing significant variation for judgments about such crime 
would undercut the case for empirical deserts in this context.  Moreover, such findings 
would raise the question of what accounts for differences in lay judgments about 
punishment for this type of crime. Are there individual differences that explain the 
variance?  We turn to this question next.  
2.4 Need for Cognition 
Which individuals are most likely to support retributive punishment in response to 
crime?  Research suggests that individual differences in the ‘need for cognition’ (“NFC”) 
may partly explain support for retributive punishment.  The NFC is understood as “the 
tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive activity (Petty, Cacioppo, & Kao, 
1984).”  People with high NFC enjoy and are more inclined to engage in activities 
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requiring effortful thought.  These individuals naturally tend to seek, acquire, think 
about, and reflect back on information to make decisions.  Individuals with low NFC, in 
contrast, tend to rely on others (eg., celebrities and experts) and cognitive heuristics 
(Cacioppo et al., 1996).  It is not that such people are incapable of effortful thought; 
these “cognitive misers” are just less likely to engage in it (Cacioppo et al., 1996).   
Suspecting a link between NFC and support for punishment, Sargent 
hypothesized that individuals with low NFC would express greater support for punitive 
punishment; or, as he put it, “less thought, more punishment.” (Sargent, 2004)   As 
expected, he found that, after controlling for gender and political ideology, need for 
cognition and punitiveness were negatively related.  Moreover, he found that the 
relationship between NFC and support for punishment was mediated by attributional 
complexity (Fletcher et al., 1986); that is, low NFC individuals show greater support for 
punitive punishment because they tend to generate simplistic attributions of blame, 
whereas high NFC individuals show less support for punishment because they tend to 
generate complex attributions of blame.   
Consistent with dual-process theory, these findings show that individuals who 
rely less on controlled cognition tend to be more retributive in response to crime.  
Further, the findings indicate that causal attributions mediate the relationship between 
NFC and support for punishment, suggesting that blame plays an important role.  Yet 
whether these findings hold for various crime types remains unknown.  What’s more, 
the relationship between the need for cognition and support for consequentialist 
responses to crime has yet to be explored.  Do high need for cognition individuals show 
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greater support for rehabilitation? If so, is this because of the way high need for 
cognition individuals attribute blame?  
2.5 Intergroup Bias 
Social psychologists have shown that blacks are perceived as posing a greater criminal 
threat than members of other racial groups. (Correll et al., 2002; Eberhard et al., 2004; 
Chiricos, McEntire, & Gertz, 2001).  Moreover, researchers have found differences in 
the level of perceived threat among blacks; specifically, blacks with more stereotypically 
black features are more likely to be seen as criminal (Eberhardt et al., 2004).  The 
perceived blackness of a defendant has also been shown to influence judgments of 
punishment; the more stereotypically black a defendant is perceived to be, the more 
likely that person is to be sentenced to death.   
Such research shows how bias in psychological processes can lead to racial 
disparate judgments.  Using a novel method, Hetey and Eberhardt have also begun to 
probe the opposite causal pathway: whether racial disparities themselves can cause 
biased judgments (Hetey & Eberhardt, 2014).  In one study, they tested whether 
extreme racial disparities in the prison population would influence California residents’ 
decision to support an initiative reducing the severity of three-strikes laws.  On an iPad, 
62 white participants were shown a 40-second video in which 80 color photographs of 
black and white offenders flashed across the screen.  The video was meant to convey 
information about the racial makeup of the state prison.  The ratio of black-to-white 
inmates was manipulated to portray racial disparities as more or less extreme: in the 
less black condition, 25% of the photographs were of black inmates; in the more black 
condition, 45% of the photographs were of black inmates.  The percentages 
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approximate the overall percentage of blacks in California state prison and the 
percentage of blacks incarcerated under California three-strikes laws, respectively.  
Participants were then given information about the existing three-strikes law and a 
proposed reform bill, and were asked to rate the current law’s punitiveness on a Likert 
scale from 1 (not punitive enough) to 7 (too punitive).  Finally, they were asked to sign a 
petition to be forwarded to the state attorney general supporting the reform bill.  As 
predicted, the degree of racial disparity depicted in the prison population affected 
support for the reform bill: 52% in the less black condition signed the petition compared 
to just 27% in the more black condition. 
One possible explanation is inter-group bias. According to inter-group bias 
theory, members of an in-group tend to favor members of the same, and derogate 
members of out-groups (Brewer, 1999; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002).  Seen this 
way, the findings above could be understood as white in-group derogation of a black 
out-group perceived to pose a threat to public safety.  By the same token, one as yet 
unexamined possibility is white in-group bias in favor of white populations—in the form 
of support for consequentialist criminal-justice reform.  In fact, some contend that such 
white in-group favoritism accounts for the current movement towards rehabilitation 
rather than retributive punishment in response to the ongoing opiate abuse epidemic 
(Yankah, 2016).  Carl Hart, a leading drug addiction researcher, points out that this 
would fit with a historical pattern of “cognitive flexibility” regarding drug policy: harsh 
penalties for some (blacks) and sympathetic treatment for others (whites) (Hart, 2017).  
Demographic research shows that whites now comprise 90% of new opiate users, up 
from 50% in the 1960s (Cicero, Ellis, Surratt, & Kurtz, 2014).   Moreover, research 
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shows that the consequences of this shift have been especially devastating for middle-
age white Americans.  For example, Case and Deaton have uncovered rising mortality 
rates for this demographic group—a trend running in the opposite direction of every 
other age group, racial and ethnic group, as well as counterparts in other rich countries 
(Case & Deaton, 2015).  
According to dual-process theory, prejudicial responses to racial out-groups 
represent a default setting acquired through cultural learning; that is, out-group bias is 
an automatic response that tends toward deontological judgments (Greene, J. D., 
2014).  As such, a broader interpretation of the findings above is that racism leads to 
automatic responses, thereby fueling support for retributive punishment.  But does this 
process work in the opposite direction? Would prompting people to view drug crime as 
an in-group problem influence support for consequentialist drug policies?  Such findings 
would suggest that inter-group bias can work like a switch, from automatic judgments 
that favor punishment to manual judgments that favor rehabilitation.  Are there other 
factors capable of moving judgments from automatic to manual mode?  Research 
suggests that folk intuitions about free will may represent another such moral mode 
switch.  
2.6 Free Will 
Folk intuitions concerning free-will give us the strong sense that humans, unlike 
computers, have conscious control over their actions (Nahmias et al., 2005).  But the 
more science teaches us about the inner workings of the natural world, the less 
plausible these intuitions about free-will become—after all, if everything in our 
mechanical universe can be fully explained by prior events, then humans are either a 
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glaring exception to the rule, or just another collection of atoms buffeted about by 
physical forces.  In theory, doubts about free-will should affect judgments of criminal 
wrongdoing, since such judgments are premised on an assumption of free-will—to 
freely choose to commit crime.  
Several lines of research suggest a link between folk free-will and judgments of 
criminal responsibility.  First, researchers found that participants whose free-will beliefs 
were experimentally diminished were less likely to hold themselves responsible for bad 
behavior; specifically, participants exposed to an anti-free-will manipulation were less 
likely to help others, more likely to lie, cheat, steal, and act aggressively than 
participants in a control group (Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009; Vohs & 
Schooler, 2008). 
Second, researchers found a relationship between beliefs in free-will and support 
for punitive punishment.  Krueger et al., for example, found that strong free-will beliefs 
were associated with support for more punitive punishment (Krueger et al., 2014).  
However, this positive association was found only for transgressions that were not 
particularly emotionally arousing. That is, for emotionally charged transgressions, such 
as core crimes, free-will beliefs were not associated with support for punishment, 
whereas for less arousing crimes, such as non-core crimes, free-will beliefs were 
associated with support for harsh punishment.   
Finally, in the most direct study of the relationship between free-will and support 
for retributive punishment, Shariff et al., tested whether diminishing free-will beliefs 
would lead people to see others’ as less responsible for their bad behavior, and thereby 
reduce support for punishment (Shariff et al., 2014).  In a study of 240 Americans 
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conducted via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, they examined whether free-will beliefs were 
positively associated with support for retributive punishment.  Participants completed 
the seven-item Free Will subscale of the Free Will and Determinism Plus scale.  To 
measure attitudes about retribution, participants read descriptions of retributivism and 
consequentialism as justifications for punishment and then indicated how important 
retributivism and consequentialism should be in determining criminal punishment.  
Participants also completed questions about education, religiosity, political ideology, 
and demographics.  As hypothesized, stronger beliefs in free-will predicted greater 
support for retributive punishment, but did not predict support for consequentialist 
punishment.  In a second study of 46 students, participants were randomly assigned to 
read (1) a passage from Crick’s Astonishing Hypothesis that argues against the notion 
of free-will, or (2) a neutral free-will condition unrelated to the same, a task which had 
been previously validated (Vohs et al., 2008).  Participants then read a vignette about a 
person who beat a man to death.  Assigned the role of jurors, participants were asked to 
recommend a prison sentence that the offender should serve following a 2-year, nearly 
100% effective rehabilitation program. The fact that the offender had been rehabilitated 
was included in order to isolate participants’ desire for punishment as retribution.  They 
found that participants in the anti-free-will group recommended roughly half the length of 
imprisonment (~5 years) compared to the control (~10 years).  
Consistent with dual-process theory, these findings suggest that damping folk 
intuitions about free-will diminishes support for retributive punishment.  In this way, 
perceptions of free-will may represent yet another switch capable of moving moral 
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judgments from automatic to manual mode—from support for backward-looking 




CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES 
Dual-process theory predicts that the two cognitive systems underlying moral decision-
making—automatic and manual mode—tend toward two distinct kinds of judgments; 
namely, that automatic mode favors deontological judgments and manual mode favors 
consequentialist judgments (Greene, J. D., 2014).  Although punishment can be 
employed towards either deontological or consequentialist ends, retributive punishment, 
which has been ascendant over the last three decades in the form of “positive” 
retribution, is wholly deontological, meaning that it is justified based on its intrinsic 
character as a deserved response to crime, not its consequentialist effects (Duff, 2008).  
As we have seen, research shows that there is considerable agreement among 
laypeople that the correct response to “core” wrongdoing (eg., murder, rape, or robbery) 
is retributive punishment.  Such widespread agreement in favor of retribution suggests 
that these judgments result from an intuitive, automatic response—or, put in terms of 
dual-process theory, from reasoning in automatic mode.  Moreover, consistent with 
dual-process theory, research shows that individual differences and situational factors 
can promote intuitive reasoning in automatic mode—low “need for cognition,” racial 
bias, folk free-will beliefs—and thereby increase support for retributive punishment.  The 
current dissertation extends this line of research in two important ways: (1) it includes 
an examination of various crime types; (2) explores the relationship between the 
previously mentioned factors and support for consequentialist responses to crime.  In 
all, four hypotheses are tested:    
H1: There is dissensus among laypeople about the deserved punishment for non-“core” 
drug crimes, and that it is greater than dissensus for “core” crime. 
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H2: The ‘need for cognition’ (1) negatively relates to support for retributive punishment 
of drug crime; (2) positively relates to support for a rehabilitative approach to drug 
crime; (3) blame mediates these relationships. 
H3: Participants exposed to a high white representation of criminal offenders show (1) 
less support for retributive punishment of drug crime; (2) more support for a 
rehabilitative approach to drug crime; (3) blame mediates these relationships. 
H4: : Participants exposed to an “anti-free-will” manipulation show (1) less support for 
retributive punishment of drug crime; (2) more support for a rehabilitative approach to 




CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODS 
4.1 Sample 
For the four above-stated studies, participants who are age-qualified jurors were 
randomly drawn from the Mechanical Turk worker pool.  Research suggests that this 
population is as representative of the U.S. population as traditional subject pools, with 
gender, race, age and education all matching the population more than college 
undergraduate samples and internet samples (Paolacci, G., Chandler, J., & Ipeirotis, P. 
G., 2010; Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D., 2011).  However, it also shows 
that Mechanical Turk workers skew younger, more educated, underemployed, less 
religious, and more liberal than the general population (Shapiro, D. N., Chandler, J., & 
Mueller, P. A., 2013).  Experimental instruments were created and administered via 
Qualtrics, with survey questions randomly ordered for each participant. Data was 
analyzed using SPSS.  Missing data was removed through listwise deletion.  
4.2 Procedures & Materials 
Study 1: In Study 1 participants were randomly presented two tasks: (1) a series of 12 
randomly ordered vignettes in which a person commits a “core” crime; (2) a series of 12 
randomly ordered vignettes in which a person commits a non-“core” drug crime; (see: 
Appendix A).   
Study 2: In Study 2, participants were asked to complete the 18-item short ‘need for 
cognition’ scale, whose reliability and validity is well-documented (Sadowski, 1993; 
Tolentino, Curry, & Leak, 1990) (see: Appendix B).  They then read 6 short vignettes 
from three different categories of crime (2 drug crimes, 2 crimes against property, 2 
violent crimes against persons), varying in degree across the non-“core” to “core” crime 
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spectrum (see: Appendix C).  After each, they completed a 5-item retribution measure 
(see: Appendix D), and a 2-item consequentialist measure (see: Appendix E).  To 
measure perceptions of offender blame, participants were asked to rate the degree to 
which an offender deserves blame (How much personal blame does the offender in this 
scenario deserve for his or her actions? From 1=Not all deserving of personal blame to 
7=Completely Deserving of Blame (endpoints labeled)) (Shariff et al., 2014).  For the 
retribution, consequentialist, and blame measures, participants’ scores were averaged 
from scores on the two scenarios in the same crime category in order to create a single 
composite measure for drug crime, property crime, and violent crime.  
Study 3: In study 3, participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups: (1) in 
the experimental group participants watched a 40-s video in which 80 color photographs 
of male faces (10% Black and 90% White) flashed across the screen; (2) in the control 
group participants watched a 40-s video in which 80 color photographs of male faces 
(50% Black and 50%, White) flashed across the screen.  Drawn from real mug shots, 
the images were shown as a representation of criminal offenders in a specific 
jurisdiction.  (Notice that these racial compositions reflect the previously mentioned 
demographic shift in new opiate drug users from 1960 to present.)  As a manipulation 
check, participants estimated the racial composition of offenders.  Participants then 
completed the retribution, rehabilitation, and blame measures.    
Study 4: In study 4, participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups: (1) in 
the experimental group participants were exposed to an argument against the notion of 
free-will (see: Appendix F); (2) in the control group participants were exposed to a 
passage unrelated to free-will (see: Appendix G). Participants completed the Free Will 
28 
 
and Determinism (FAD) subscale on free-will beliefs (See: Appendix H).  The sign of 
participants’ scores on the FAD scale was reversed so that a strongly positive score 
indicating free-will belief was treated as a strongly negative score indicating free-will 
doubt.  Finally, participants completed the previously mentioned retribution, 
rehabilitation, and blame measures.   
4.3 Control Variables 
Based on prior research, the regression models include well-documented predictors of 
lay attitudes about how to respond to crime: (female = 1, male = 0); ethnicity (Black=1, 
White=0; Hispanic=1, White=0; Asian=1, White=0), age (in years); education (from 
1=less than high school to 7=graduate/professional degree); political orientation (from 
1=Very Liberal to 7=Very Conservative); religiosity (What is your level of religiosity? 
(from 1=Not Very Religious to 10=Very Religious); victimization (Have you or a close 
family member ever been the victim of a serious crime? (yes=1, no=0) (Applegate, 





CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
5.1 Study 1: Empirical Desert 
Drawn from the Mechanical Turk worker pool, this study included 255 participants who 
successfully completed the tasks.  Fifty-five percent of the participants were male 
(n=137) and 45% percent were female (n=113).   Seventy-five percent of participants 
identified as White (n=189), 10% as Black (n=25), 8% percent as Asian (n=21), and 6% 
percent as Hispanic (n=15).  Ages ranged from 19 to 70, with a mean age of 35.8 
(SD=11.3); thirty-seven percent were in their 20s (n=94), 31% were in their 30s (n=78), 
16% in their 40s (n=40), and 11% in their 50s (n=27).  Forty percent of participants 
completed a bachelor’s degree (n=100), 31% high school (n=78), and 21% an 
associate’s degree (n=52).  On a single-item measure of political orientation, 49% of 
participants indicated moderate (n=123), 34% percent liberal (n=84), and 18% 
conservative (n=44).  On a single-item measure of religiosity, 58% indicated not very 
religious (n=145), 20% moderately religious (n=57), and 23% very religious (n=49).  





Demographics of Study 1 Sample 
Characteristic             Total Sample            
Gender   
 n 255 
 % Male 54.6 
 % Female 45 
 %Other 0.4 
Ethnicity n 255 
 % White 75.3 
 % Black  10 
 % Asian 8.4 
 % Hispanic 6 
 % Other 0.4 
Age n 255 
 % < 20 1.2 
 % 20-29 37.5 
 % 30 -39 31.1 
 % 40-49 15.9 
 % 50-59 10.8 
 % > 59 3.6 
Education n 255 
 % Less than High School 0.4 
 % High School 31.1 
 % Associate Degree 20.7 
 % Bachelor Degree 39.8 
 % Graduate Degree 8 
Political Orientation n 255 
 % Liberal 33.5 
 % Moderate 49 
 % Conservative 17.5 
Religiosity n 255 
 % Not Very Religious 57.8 
 % Moderately Religious 19.5 
 % Very Religious 22.7 
Victim of Crime n 255 
 % Yes 20.7 
 % No  72.9 
  % Unsure 6.4 
 
As shown in tables 5.2 and 5.3, with regard to core crimes, participants broadly 
agreed in their relative judgments about how much punishment a person deserves, with 
a Kendall’s W coefficient of concordance (a scale ranging from 0 to 1) of .65 (p<.000); 
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however, about non-core crimes, disagreement was marked, with a Kendall’s W 
coefficient of concordance of .33 (p<.000). 
Table 5.2 
Summary Data from Core Crime Ordinal Ranking Task 








251 (larceny - buffet line) 1 1 1.99 2.19 
251 (larceny - clock radio) 2 2 3.09 2.36 
251 (larceny - television) 3 3 3.91 2.12 
251 (slap) 4 4 4.42 2.11 
251 (head-butt) 5 5 5.35 1.65 
251 (knock down and kick) 7 6 6.39 1.62 
251 (robbery - gold necklace) 7 6 6.02 1.99 
251 (robbery with weapon - 
wallet) 
8 8 7.25 1.89 
251 (negligent homicide of 
toddler) 
9 9 9.25 2.09 
251 (homicide with letter-
opener) 
10 10 9.46 2.02 
251 (premeditated homicide) 11 11 10.15 1.96 
251 (arson-murder) 12 12 10.72 2.5 
 Kendall’s W=.65, p<.000 
  
Table 5.3 
Summary Data from Noncore Drug Crime Ordinal Ranking Task 








249 (possession marijuana - 1/2 gram) 1 1 3.24 3.62 
249 (possession ecstasy - 4 grams) 3 4 4.54 2.69 
249 (possession cocaine - 6 lines) 4 5 5.23 2.7 
249 (possession crack-cocaine - 1/20th 
ounce) 
4 4 4.75 2.53 
249 (possession heroin - 1/10 ounce) 5 5 5.43 2.19 
249 (driving under influence of alcohol) 6 6 6.16 3.15 
249 (sale marijuana - 10 ounces) 7 6 5.49 2.64 
249 (sale cocaine - 500 grams) 8 8 7.76 2.06 
249 (sale heroin - 3 ounces) 9 9 8.09 2.55 
249 (manufacturing methamphetamines) 10 9 8.48 2.92 
249 (import cocaine - 5 kilograms) 11 10 9.13 3.08 
249 (import heroin - 1 kilogram) 12 11 9.71 3.47 
Kendall’s W=.33, p<.000 
 
5.2 Study 2: Need for Cognition 
 
Drawn from the Mechanical Turk worker pool, this study included 248 participants who 
successfully completed the tasks.  Fifty-five percent of the participants were male 
(n=136) and 44% percent were female (n=109).   Seventy-three percent of participants 
identified as White (n=181), 10% percent as Asian (n=24), 9% as Black (n=21), and 6% 
percent as Hispanic (n=15).  Ages ranged from 18 to 70, with a mean age of 37 
(SD=12.5); thirty-four percent of participants were in their 20s (n=44), 32% were in their 
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30s (n=78), 14% in their 40s (n=34), and 11% in their 50s (n=28).  Forty-two percent of 
participants completed a bachelor’s degree (n=104), 27% high school (n=67), and 17% 
an associate’s degree (n=42).  On a single-item measure of political orientation, 46% of 
participants indicated moderate (n=113), 41% percent liberal (n=101), and 13% 
conservative (n=33).  On a single-item measure of religiosity, 61% indicated not very 
religious (n=151), 16% moderately religious (n=39), and 23% very religious (n=58).  





Demographics of Study 2 Sample 
Characteristic             Total Sample 
Gender   
 n 245 
 % Male 54.8 
 % Female 44.0 
 %Other 0 
Ethnicity N 248 
 % White 73 
 % Black  8.5 
 % Asian 9.7 
 % Hispanic 6.0 
 % Other 2.8 
Age n 248 
 % < 20 1.2 
 % 20-29 33.9 
 % 30 -39 31.5 
 % 40-49 13.7 
 % 50-59 11.3 
 % > 59 7.7 
Education n 248 
 % Less than High School .4 
 % High School 27 
 % Associate Degree 16.9 
 % Bachelor Degree 41.9 
 % Graduate Degree 13.7 
Political Orientation n 247 
 % Liberal 40.7 
 % Moderate 45.6 
 % Conservative 13.3 
Religiosity n 248 
 % Not Very Religious 60.9 
 % Moderately Religious 15.7 
 % Very Religious 23.4 
Victim of Crime n 248 
 % Yes 20.2 
 % No  75 
  % Unsure 4.8 
 
The NFC, an 18-item scale, showed strong internal consistency, with a 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .95.  The Retribution Scale, a 5-item scale, was 
administered after each of the six crime scenarios.  It showed moderate internal 
consistency for each scenario, with Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of greater than .7.  
The Consequentialist Scale, a 2-item scale, was also administered after each of the six 
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crime vignettes.  It showed moderate internal consistency for some crime scenarios, but 
for others fell below acceptable levels.  Since Cronbach alpha values are sensitive to 
the number of items in a scale, this is not surprising.  For such scales, inter-item 
correlations (optimally between .2 and .4) are suggested as an alternative indicator of 
consistency (Briggs & Cheek, 1986), which are shown below in Table 5.5.  However, 
these values also suggest problematic levels of internal consistency on the Utilitarian 
Scale.  
Table 5.5 
Reliability of Scales 
Scale   Number of 
Items 
Cronbach α Pearson inter-item correlation 
     
Need for Cognition  18 .946  
Retribution  5   
 Drug Crime (scenario 1)  .758  
 Drug Crime (scenario 2)  .771  
 Property Crime (scenario 1)  .756  
 Property Crime (scenario 2)  .773  
 Violent Crime (scenario 1)  .769  
 Violent Crime (scenario 2)  .786  
Consequentialist  2   
 Drug Crime (scenario 1)  .767 .62 
 Drug Crime (scenario 2)  .647 .48 
 Property Crime (scenario 1)  .635 .47 
 Property Crime (scenario 2)  .629 .47 
 Violent Crime (scenario 1)  .579 .42 
  Violent Crime (scenario 2)   .525 .36 
 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare participants’ 
scores on both the Retribution Scale and the Consequentialist Scale in response to 
crime vignettes spanning the severity spectrum, from drug crime, to property crime, to 
violent crime.  The means and standard deviations are presented below in Tables 5.6 
and 5.7.  As expected, participants’ mean scores on the Retribution Scale increased 
and dispersion decreased across the crime severity spectrum, with crime severity 
having a significant effect on support for retribution [Wilks’ Lambda=.42, F(2, 246)=44.2, 
p<.000, multivariate partial eta squared=.27.]  However, while crime severity also had a 
significant effect on the Consequentialist Scale scores [Wilks’ Lambda=.74, F(2, 
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246)=173.2, p<.000, multivariate partial eta squared=.59.], the data indicated no clear 
pattern in relation to the crime severity spectrum. 
Table 5.6 
Descriptive Statistics for Retribution Scales  
Retribution Scale N Min Max Mean Standard Deviation 
Drug Crime 248 1 7 4.9 1.19 
Property Crime 248 2.5 7 5.6 1.06 
Violent Crime 248 2.5 7 6.2 0.95 
 
Table 5.7 
Descriptive Statistics for Consequentialist Scales  
Consequentialist Scale N Min Max Mean Standard Deviation 
Drug Crime 248 1 7 5.2 1.4 
Property Crime 248 1 7 5.5 1.3 
Violent Crime 248 1 7 4.7 1.6 
 
Drug Crime (Retribution Scale) 
 
Standard multiple regression was used to test the following explanatory model: 
 
Y = a0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 + b10X10 + b11X11 + e, 
 
where Y =  support for retribution against drug crime (measured on a 7-point scale); x1 = 
age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree attainment); x3 = political 
ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity (measured on a 10-point scale); 
x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = dummy variable for Hispanic 
relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to White; x8 = dummy variable 
for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for Victimized relative to Never 
Victimized; x10 = need for cognition (sum of 18-item scale with scores ranging from -72 
to 72); x11 = blame (measured on a 7-point scale). To evaluate blame as a mediator, the 
model was run hierarchically, first with blame left out and then with blame included.  
 Table 5.8 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of the 
variables found to be statistically significant, blame was the most strongly correlated 
with support for retribution against drug crime (.53), followed by religiosity (.26), political 
ideology (.21) and age (.20).  There were no concerning bivariate correlations among 
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the variables indicating collinearity (Tabachnick, Fidell & Osterlind, 2001).  This was 
confirmed by an inspection of collinearity statistics, displayed in Table 5.9, which shows 
Tolerance values above .10 and VIF values less than 10 (Myers, 1990).  
Table 5.8 
Pearson Product-Moment: Drug Crime Retribution 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1: Drug Crime (retribution) —            
2: Age 0.20*** —           
3: Education 0.07 0.12* —          
4: Political Ideology 0.21*** 0.01 -0.04 —         
5: Religiosity 0.26*** 0.16** -0.03 0.42*** —        
6: Black 0.09 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 0.25*** —       
7: Hispanic 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.10* 0.01 -0.08 —      
8: Asian 0.05 -0.19*** 0.10* -0.01 -0.09 -0.10* -0.08 —     
9: Female 0.09 0.20*** 0.01 -0.07 0.20*** 0.02 -0.09 -0.13* —    
10: Victimized 0.04 0.15* -0.05 0.14* 0.16** 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.03 —   
11: NFC -0.06 0.04 0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 0.05 -0.13* -0.06 0.09 —  
12: Blame 0.53*** 0.23*** 0.02 0.19*** 0.27*** 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.06 — 




  Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.82 1.23 
Education 0.95 1.05 
Political Ideology 0.74 1.35 
Religiosity 0.66 1.51 
Black 0.88 1.14 
Hispanic 0.94 1.07 
Asian 0.89 1.12 
Female 0.88 1.14 
Victimized 0.93 1.07 
NFC 0.95 1.05 
Blame 0.86 1.17 
 
Table 5.10 summarizes the regression analysis results for both model 1 (all 
predictors except blame) and model 2 (full model).  Model 1 significantly predicted 
support for retribution against drug crime, R2=.15, R2adj =.11, F(10, 246)=4.0, p<.001.  
Overall, it accounted for 15% of the variance in support for retribution.  Two variables 
were statistically significant, political ideology and age, with least-squares estimates as 
follows 
Ŷ = 3.28 + .02 (Age) + .12 (Political Ideology) 
 
Model 2 also significantly predicted support for retribution against drug crime, 
R2=.32, R2adj =.29, F(11, 245)=4.0, p<.001.  This model accounted for 32% of the 
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variance in support for retribution against drug crime, a markedly larger proportion than 
model 1.  Notably, after controlling for the effects of both political ideology and age, 
blame was the only significant predictor, yielding the following least-squares estimate: 
Ŷ = 2.29 + .31 (Blame) 
 
Table 5.10 
Hierarchical Regression: Drug Crime Retribution 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age 0.02*** 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.09 
Education 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Political Ideology 0.12** 0.05 0.18 0.07* 0.04 0.11 
Religiosity 0.05 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.06 
Black 0.38 0.27 0.09 0.24 0.24 0.06 
Hispanic 0.41 0.31 0.08 0.22 0.28 0.04 
Asian 0.45 0.25 0.11 0.30 0.23 0.08 
Female 0.12 0.15 0.05 0.13 0.14 0.05 
Victimized -0.12 0.18 -0.04 -0.01 0.17 0.00 
NFC 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
Blame    0.31*** 0.04 0.46 
R2   0.15   0.32 
Adjusted R2   0.11   0.29 
F    3.97***   9.91*** 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically test blame as a mediator.  Based on 
10,000 bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path analysis, 
after adjusting for the covariates in the full regression model (age, education, political 
ideology, religiosity, ethnicity, gender, victimized), showed that blame does not indirectly 
influence the relationship between the NFC and support for retribution against drug 
crime, since the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval includes zero, ab= .00 (95% CI 








Property Crime (Retribution Scale) 
 
Standard multiple regression was conducted to test the following explanatory model: 
 
Y = a0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 + b10X10 + b11X11 + e, 
 
where Y =  support for retribution against property crime (measured on a 7-point scale); 
x1 = age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree attainment); x3 = 
political ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity (measured on a 10-point 
scale); x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = dummy variable for Hispanic 
relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to White; x8 = dummy variable 
for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for Victimized relative to Never 
Victimized; x10 = need for cognition (sum of 18-item scale with scores ranging from -72 
to 72); x11 = blame (measured on a 7-point scale).  To evaluate blame as a mediator, 
the model was run hierarchically, first with blame left out and then with blame included.  
 Table 5.11 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of 
the variables found to be statistically significant, blame was the most strongly correlated 
with support for retribution against property crime (.57), followed by age (.21), Asian 
39 
 
(.11) and political ideology (.10).  There were no concerning bivariate correlations 
among the variables indicating collinearity.  This was further confirmed by an inspection 
of collinearity statistics, displayed in Table 5.12, which shows Tolerance values above 
.10 and VIF values less than 10 (Myers, 1990).  
Table 5.11 
Pearson product-moment: Property Crime Retribution 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Property Crime (retribution) —            
2. Age 0.21*** —           
3. Education 0.03 0.14* —          
4. Political Ideology 0.10* 0.02 -0.05 —         
5. Religiosity 0.10 0.17** -0.04 0.42*** —        
6. Black  0.05 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 0.25*** —       
7. Hispanic  0.00 -0.06 0.07 -0.09* 0.02 -0.08 —      
8. Asian  0.11* -0.19*** 0.10* -0.01 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 —     
9. Female  0.06 0.21*** 0.00 -0.08 0.19*** 0.02 -0.08 -0.13* —    
10. Victimized  0.10 0.15* -0.05 0.13* 0.16** 0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.03 —   
11. NFC 0.06 0.04 0.04 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 0.04 -0.13* -0.06 0.09 —  
12: Blame 0.57*** 0.26*** -0.09 -.082 0.028 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.10* 0.06 0.09 — 




  Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.82 1.23 
Education 0.95 1.05 
Political Ideology 0.74 1.35 
Religiosity 0.66 1.51 
Black 0.88 1.14 
Hispanic 0.94 1.07 
Asian 0.89 1.12 
Female 0.88 1.14 
Victimized 0.93 1.07 
NFC 0.95 1.05 
Blame 0.86 1.17 
 
Table 5.13 summarizes the regression analysis results.  Model 1 significantly 
predicted support for retribution against property crime, R2=.10, R2adj =.07, F(10, 
246)=2.7, p<.003.  Overall, it accounted for a modest 10% of the variation in support for 
retribution against property crime.  Two variables were statistically significant, Asian and 
age, with least-squares estimates as follows: 
 




Model 2 also significantly predicted support for retribution against property crime, 
R2=.37, R2adj =.34, F(11, 244)=12.5, p<.01.  This model accounted for 37% of the 
variance in support for retribution against property crime, a markedly larger proportion 
than model 1. Two variables were statistically significant, political ideology and blame, 
with least-squares estimates as follows: 
 
Ŷ = .73 + .63 (Blame) + .08 (Political Ideology)  
 
Notably, the addition of blame washed out the effects of both age and ethnicity.   
It also revealed a slight suppression effect of political ideology: once perceptions of 
blame were controlled for, conservative views were shown to be positively related to 
support for retribution. 
Table 5.13 
Hierarchical Regression: Property Crime Retribution 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age 0.02*** 0.01 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.06 
Education -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.08 0.06 0.08 
Political Ideology 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.08** 0.04 0.13 
Religiosity -0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 
Black 0.35 0.25 0.09 0.21 0.21 0.06 
Hispanic 0.22 0.28 0.05 -0.14 0.24 -0.03 
Asian 0.67** 0.23 0.19 0.34 0.20 0.10 
Female 0.09 0.14 0.04 -0.01 0.12 0.00 
Victimized 0.10 0.17 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.03 
NFC 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Blame    0.63*** 0.06 0.57 
R2   0.10   0.37 
Adjusted R2   0.07   0.34 
F      2.73**     12.51*** 
*<.05, **<.01,***<.001 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically test blame as a mediator.  Based on 10,000 
bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path analysis, after 
adjusting for covariates included in the model, showed that blame does not indirectly 
influence the relationship between the NFC and support for retribution against property 
crime, since the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval includes zero, ab=.00 (95% CI 




Indirect Effect of NFC on Property Crime Retribution via Blame 
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Violent Crime (Retribution Scale) 
 
Standard multiple regression was conducted to test the following explanatory model: 
 
Y = a0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 + b10X10 + b11X11 + e, 
 
where Y =  support for retribution against violent crime (measured on a 7-point scale); x1 
= age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree attainment); x3 = 
political ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity (measured on a 10-point 
scale); x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = dummy variable for Hispanic 
relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to White; x8 = dummy variable 
for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for Victimized relative to Never 
Victimized; x10 = need for cognition (sum of 18-item scale with scores ranging from -72 
to 72); x11 = blame (measured on a 7-point scale).  To evaluate blame as a mediator, 
the model was run hierarchically, first with blame left out and then with blame included.  
 Table 5.14 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of 
the variables found to be statistically significant, blame was the most strongly correlated 
with support for retribution against violent crime (.68), followed by age (.22), religiosity 
(.13), victimized (.13), female (.13), and Asian (.10).  There were no concerning 
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bivariate correlations among the variables indicating collinearity.  This was further 
confirmed by an inspection of collinearity statistics, displayed in Table 5.15, which 
shows Tolerance values above .10 and VIF values less than 10 (Myers, 1990).  
Table 5.14 
Pearson Product-Moment: Violent Crime Retribution 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1: Violent crime (retribution) —            
2: Age .22*** —           
3: Education -.02 .11* —          
4: Political Ideology .01 .02 -.05 —         
5: Religiosity .13* .17** -.04 .43*** —        
 6: Black .04 -.06 -.07 -.01 .25*** —       
7: Hispanic .04 -.04 .04 -.10* .01 -.08 —      
8: Asian .10* -.19*** .11* -.01 -.09 -.10 -.08 —     
9: Female .13* .19*** .01 -.08 .19*** .02 -.09 -.13* —    
10: Victimized .13* .14 -.04 .13* .16** .03 .00 -.03 .03 —   
11: NFC .00 .05 .03 -.08 -.05 -.05 .04 -.13* -.06 .08 —  
12: Blame .68*** .24*** .03 .19*** .28*** -.03 .03 .07 .14* .12* .14* — 




  Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.82 1.22 
Education 0.95 1.05 
Political Ideology 0.74 1.34 
Religiosity 0.67 1.49 
Black 0.88 1.14 
Hispanic 0.94 1.06 
Asian 0.87 1.15 
Female 0.87 1.15 
Victimized 0.94 1.07 
NFC 0.93 1.07 
Blame 0.87 1.15 
 
Table 5.16 summarizes the regression analysis results.  Model 1 significantly 
predicted support for retribution against violent crime, R2=.11, R2adj =.07, F(10, 246)=2.9, 
p<.002.  Overall, it accounted for 11% of the variance in support for retribution.  Two 
variables were statistically significant: age and Asian.  Least-squares yields the 
following estimates of these coefficients: 
 
Ŷ = 5.5 + .02 (Age) + .59 (Asian)  
 
Model 2 also significantly predicted support for retribution against violent crime, 
R2=.50, R2adj =.47, F(11, 246)=20.9, p<.01.  This model accounted for 50% of the 
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variance in support for retribution against violent crime, a markedly larger proportion 
than model 1. Two variables were statistically significant, religiosity and blame, with 
least-squares estimates as follows: 
Ŷ = 1.14 + .71 (Blame) + .03 (Religiosity)  
 
Notably, the addition of blame mediated the effects of both age and Asian.   It 
also revealed a suppression effect of political ideology: once perceptions of blame were 
controlled for, religiosity was shown to be positively related to support for retribution. 
  
Table 5.16 
Hierarchical Regression: Violent Crime Retribution 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age 0.02*** 0.01 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.06 
Education -0.05 0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00 
Political Ideology -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 
Religiosity 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.03* 0.02 0.11 
Black 0.19 0.22 0.06 0.15 0.16 0.05 
Hispanic 0.28 0.25 0.07 0.13 0.19 0.03 
Asian 0.59** 0.20 0.19 0.25 0.16 0.08 
Female 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.01 
Victimized 0.21 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.03 
NFC 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.08 
Blame    0.71*** 0.05 0.67 
R2   0.11   0.50 
Adjusted R2   0.07   0.47 
F     2.84**     20.93*** 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically examine blame as a mediator.  Based 
on 10,000 bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path 
analysis, after adjusting for covariates included in the model, showed that blame does 
not indirectly influences the relationship between the NFC and support for retribution 
against violent crime, since the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval includes zero, 









Indirect Effect of NFC on Violent Crime Retribution via Blame 
 
 
Drug Crime (Consequentialist Scale) 
 
Standard multiple regression was conducted to test the following explanatory model: 
 
Y = a0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 + b10X10 + b11X11 + e, 
 
where Y =  support for a consequentialist response to drug crime (measured on a 7-
point scale); x1 = age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree 
attainment); x3 = political ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity 
(measured on a 10-point scale); x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = 
dummy variable for Hispanic relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to 
White; x8 = dummy variable for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for 
Victimized relative to Never Victimized; x10 = need for cognition (sum of 18-item scale 
with scores ranging from -72 to 72); x11 = blame (measured on a 7-point scale).  To 
evaluate blame as a mediator, the model was run hierarchically, first with it left out of 
the model and then with it included.  
 Table 5.17 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of 
the variables found to be statistically significant, blame was the most strongly correlated 
with support for a consequentialist response to drug crime (.18), followed by the NFC 
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(.16), and age (.14).  There were no concerning bivariate correlations among the 
variables indicating collinearity.  This was further confirmed by an inspection of 
collinearity statistics, displayed in Table 5.18, which shows Tolerance values above .10 
and VIF values less than 10 (Myers, 1990).  
Table 5.17 
Pearson Product-Moment: Drug Crime Consequentialist 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1: Drug Crime (consequentialist) —            
2: Age 0.14* —           
3: Education -0.01 0.13* —          
4: Political Ideology -0.03 0.01 -0.04 —         
5: Religiosity 0.04 0.16** -0.03 0.42*** —        
 6: Black 0.02 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 0.25*** —       
7: Hispanic 0.09 -0.04 0.04 -0.10* 0.01 -0.08 —      
8: Asian -0.13* -0.19*** 0.10* -0.01 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 —     
9: Female 0.06 0.20*** 0.01 -0.07 0.20*** 0.02 -0.09 -0.13* —    
10: Victimized 0.09 0.15* -0.05 0.14* 0.16* 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.03 —   
11: NFC 0.16* 0.04 0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 0.05 -0.13* -0.06 0.09 —  
12: Blame 0.18** 0.24*** 0.02 0.20*** 0.27*** 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.06 — 




  Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.82 1.23 
Education 0.95 1.05 
Political Ideology 0.74 1.35 
Religiosity 0.66 1.51 
Black 0.88 1.14 
Hispanic 0.94 1.07 
Asian 0.89 1.12 
Female 0.88 1.14 
Victimized 0.93 1.07 
NFC 0.95 1.05 
Blame 0.86 1.17 
 
Table 5.19 summarizes the regression analysis results.  Model 1 did not 
significantly predict support for a consequentialist response to drug crime, R2=.06, R2adj 
=.02, F(10, 246)=1.5, p<.155.  However, a single variable was statistically significant: 
the NFC.  On the other hand, model 2 was statistically significant, R2=.09, R2adj =.05, 
F(11, 245)=2.19, p<.05, although it accounted for only a modest 9% of the variation. 
Two variables were statistically significant, blame and the NFC, with least-squares 
estimates as follows: 




Notably, the effect of the NFC found in model 1 was not diminished after 
adjusting for blame.   
Table 5.19 
Hierarchical Regression: Drug Crime Consequentialist 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.07 
Education -0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.03 0.09 -0.02 
Political Ideology -0.02 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 -0.04 
Religiosity 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 
Black 0.17 0.35 0.03 0.08 0.34 0.02 
Hispanic 0.55 0.39 0.09 0.45 0.39 0.07 
Asian -0.37 0.33 -0.08 -0.43 0.32 -0.09 
Female 0.15 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.19 0.04 
Victimized 0.25 0.24 0.07 0.26 0.23 0.07 
NFC 0.01* 0.01 0.13 0.01* 0.01 0.14 
Blame    0.15** 0.06 0.19 
R2   0.06   0.09 
Adjusted R2   0.02   0.05 
F      1.46     2.19* 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically test blame as a mediator.  Based on 
10,000 bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path analysis, 
after adjusting for covariates included in the model, showed that blame does not 
indirectly influence the relationship between the NFC and support for a consequentialist 
response to drug crime, since the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval includes zero, 






Indirect Effect of NFC on Drug Crime Consequentialism via Blame
 
 
Property Crime (Consequentialist Scale) 
 
Standard multiple regression was conducted to test the following explanatory model: 
 
Y = a0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 + b10X10 + b11X11 + e, 
 
where Y =  support for a consequentialist response to property crime (measured on a 7-
point scale); x1 = age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree 
attainment); x3 = political ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity 
(measured on a 10-point scale); x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = 
dummy variable for Hispanic relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to 
White; x8 = dummy variable for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for 
Victimized relative to Never Victimized; x10 = need for cognition (sum of 18-item scale 
with scores ranging from -72 to 72); x11 = blame (measured on a 7-point scale).   To 
evaluate blame as a mediator, the model was run hierarchically, first with it left out of 
the model and then with it included.  
 Table 5.20 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of 
the variables found to be statistically significant, blame was the most strongly correlated 
with support for a consequentialist response to property crime (.24), followed closely by 
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the NFC (.23), Asian (-.17), political ideology (-.16), and victimized (.15).  There were no 
concerning bivariate correlations among the variables indicating collinearity.  This was 
further confirmed by an inspection of collinearity statistics, displayed in Table 5.21, 
which shows Tolerance values above .10 and VIF values less than 10 (Myers, 1990).  
Table 5.20 
Pearson Product-Moment: Property Crime Consequentialist 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1: Property Crime (consequentialist) —            
2: Age 0.07 —           
3: Education -0.03 0.14* —          
4: Political Ideology -0.16** 0.02 -0.05 —         
5: Religiosity -0.02 0.17** -0.04 0.42*** —        
6: Black 0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.01 0.25*** —       
7: Hispanic 0.06 -0.06 0.07 -0.09 0.02 -0.08 —      
8: Asian -0.17** -0.19*** 0.10 -0.01 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 —     
9: Female 0.08 0.21**** 0.00 -0.08 0.20*** 0.02 -0.08 -0.13* —    
10: Victimized 0.15** 0.15* -0.05 0.13* 0.16* 0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.03 —   
11: NFC 0.23*** 0.04 0.04 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 0.04 -0.13* -0.06 0.09 —  
12:  Blame 0.24*** 0.26*** -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.09 — 




  Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.77 1.30 
Education 0.92 1.09 
Political Ideology 0.76 1.32 
Religiosity 0.67 1.49 
Black 0.88 1.14 
Hispanic 0.92 1.08 
Asian 0.87 1.15 
Female 0.87 1.15 
Victimized 0.94 1.07 
NFC 0.94 1.06 
Blame 0.86 1.17 
 
Table 5.22 summarizes the regression analysis results.  Model 1 significantly 
predicted support for a consequentialist response to property crime, R2=.13, R2adj =.09, 
F(10, 246)=3.4, p<.000.  Overall, it accounted for 13% of the variation.  Three variables 
were statistically significant.  The NFC contributed the most, followed by political 
ideology and victimized.  Least-squares yields the following estimates: 
 




Model 2 was also statistically significant, R2=.16, R2adj =.13, F(11, 244)=4.2, 
p<.01.  This model accounted for 16% of the variance in support for a consequentialist 
response to property crime, only slightly larger than model 1.  Four variables were 
statistically significant.  Blameworthiness contributed the most, followed the NFC, Asian, 
and political ideology.  Least-squares yields the following estimates: 
Ŷ = 4.0 + .29 (Blame) + .01 (NFC) - .67 (Asian) - .11 (Political Ideology) + .47 (Victimized) 
 
Notably, the addition of blame did not mediate the effect of the NFC, political 
ideology, or victimized; however, it did reveal a slight suppression effect of Asian.    
Table 5.22 
Hierarchical Regression: Property Crime Consequentialist 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.06 
Education -0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.08 0.01 
Political Ideology -0.12* 0.05 -0.17 -0.11* 0.05 -0.16 
Religiosity 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 
Black 0.13 0.29 0.03 0.05 0.28 0.01 
Hispanic 0.28 0.33 0.05 0.05 0.33 0.01 
Asian -0.53* 0.27 -0.12 -0.67* 0.27 -0.16 
Female 0.17 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.04 
Victimized 0.47* 0.20 0.15 0.43* 0.19 0.14 
NFC 0.01** 0.00 0.19 0.01* 0.00 0.17 
Blame    0.29** 0.09 0.22 
R2   0.13   0.16 
Adjusted R2   0.09   0.13 
F    3.38***   4.16*** 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically test blame as a mediator.  Based on 
10,000 bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path analysis, 
after adjusting for covariates included in the model, showed that blame does not 
indirectly influences the relationship between the NFC and support for a 
consequentialist response to property crime, since the 95% bias-corrected confidence 












Violent Crime (Consequentialist Scale) 
 
Standard multiple regression was conducted to test the following explanatory model: 
 
Y = a0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 + b10X10 + b11X11 + e, 
 
where Y =  support for a consequentialist response to violent crime (measured on a 7-
point scale); x1 = age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree 
attainment); x3 = political ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity 
(measured on a 10-point scale); x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = 
dummy variable for Hispanic relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to 
White; x8 = dummy variable for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for 
Victimized relative to Never Victimized; x10 = need for cognition (sum of 18-item scale 
with scores ranging from -72 to 72); x11 = blame (measured on a 7-point scale).   To 
evaluate blame as a mediator, the model was run hierarchically, first with it left out of 
the model and then with it included.  
Table 5.23 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of 
the variables found to be statistically significant, the NFC was the most strongly 
correlated with support for a consequentialist response to violent crime (.17), followed 
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closely by political ideology (-.16) and victimized (.11).  There were no concerning 
bivariate correlations among the variables indicating collinearity.  This was further 
confirmed by an inspection of collinearity statistics, displayed in Table 5.24, which 
shows Tolerance values above .10 and VIF values less than 10 (Myers, 1990).  
Table 5.23 
Pearson-Product Moment: Violent Crime Consequentialist 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1: Violent Crime 
(consequentialist) 
—            
2: Age -0.10 —           
3: Education 0.03 0.11* —          
4: Political 
Ideology 
-0.16** 0.02 -0.05 —         
5: Religiosity 0.06 0.17** -0.04 0.43*** —        
6: Black 0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.01 0.25*** —       
7: Hispanic 0.09 -0.04 0.04 -0.10* 0.01 -0.08 —      
8: Asian -0.05 -0.19*** 0.11* -0.01 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 —     
9: Female 0.08 0.19*** 0.01 -0.08 0.19*** 0.02 -0.09 -0.13* —    
10: Victimized 0.11* 0.14*** -0.04 0.13* 0.16* 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.03 —   
11: NFC 0.17** 0.05 0.03 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 0.04 -0.13* -0.06 0.08 —  
12: Blame 0.09 0.24*** -0.03 -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.07 0.14* 0.12* 0.14* — 





  Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.82 1.22 
Education 0.95 1.05 
Political Ideology 0.74 1.34 
Religiosity 0.67 1.49 
Black 0.88 1.14 
Hispanic 0.94 1.06 
Asian 0.87 1.15 
Female 0.87 1.15 
Victimized 0.94 1.07 
NFC 0.93 1.07 
Blame 0.87 1.15 
 
Table 5.25 displays the regression analysis results.  Model 1 significantly 
predicted support for a consequentialist response to violent crime, R2=.11, R2adj =.08, 
F(10, 246)=3.0, p<.001.  Overall, it accounted for 11% of the variation.  Four variables 
were statistically significant.  Political Ideology contributed the most, followed by the 
NFC, age and victimized.  Least-squares yields the following estimates: 
 




Model 2 was also statistically significant, R2=.12, R2adj =.08, F(11, 246)=2.9, 
p<.01.  This model accounted for 12% of the variance in support for a consequentialist 
response to property crime, only slightly more than model 1.  Three variables were 
statistically significant: political ideology contributed the most, followed age and the 
NFC.  Least-squares yields the following estimates: 
Ŷ = 4.48 - .19 (Political Ideology) - .02 (Age) + .01 (NFC)  
 
Notably, the addition of blame had little impact on the NFC, age and political 
ideology, while it completely mediated the effects of victimization.   
Table 5.25 
Hierarchical Regression: Violent Crime Consequentialist 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age -0.02* 0.01 -0.16 -0.02* 0.01 -0.18 
Education 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.05 
Political Ideology -0.19** 0.07 -0.21 -0.19* 0.07 -0.20 
Religiosity 0.07 0.04 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.14 
Black 0.25 0.38 0.04 0.25 0.38 0.04 
Hispanic 0.36 0.42 0.05 0.34 0.42 0.05 
Asian -0.16 0.35 -0.03 -0.23 0.36 -0.04 
Female 0.22 0.21 0.07 0.19 0.21 0.06 
Victimized 0.49* 0.25 0.12 0.47 0.26 0.12 
NFC 0.02* 0.01 0.16 0.01* 0.01 0.15 
Blame    0.13 0.12 0.07 
R2   0.11   0.12 
Adjusted R2   0.08   0.08 
F    3.04**   2.87** 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically test blame as a mediator.  Based on 
10,000 bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path analysis, 
after controlling for covariates included in the model, showed that blame does not 
indirectly influence the relationship between the NFC and support for a consequentialist 
response to violent crime, since the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval includes 













5.3 Study 3: Intergroup Bias 
 
Drawn from the Mechanical Turk worker pool, this study included 258 participants who 
successfully completed the tasks.  Fifty-eight percent of the participants were male 
(n=149) and 42% percent were female (n=108).   Seventy-four percent of participants 
identified as White (n=191), 9% percent as Black (n=24), 8% as Asian (n=20), and 7% 
percent as Hispanic (n=19).  Ages ranged from 19 to 77, with a mean age of 36.4 
(SD=12.6); thirty-six percent of participants were in their 20s (n=93), 33% were in their 
30s (n=85), 12% in their 40s (n=32), and 9% in their 50s (n=24).  Thirty-seven percent 
of participants completed a bachelor’s degree (n=95), 28% high school (n=72), and 24% 
an associate’s degree (n=61).  On a single-item measure of political orientation, 42% of 
participants indicated moderate (n=108), 39% percent liberal (n=101), and 19% 
conservative (n=49).  On a single-item measure of religiosity, 61% indicated not very 
religious (n=157), 16% moderately religious (n=40), and 24% very religious (n=61).  





Demographics of Study 3 Sample 
Characteristic             Total Sample            
Gender   
 n 257 
 % Male 58 
 % Female 42 
 %Other 0 
Ethnicity n 258 
 % White 74 
 % Black  9.3 
 % Asian 7.8 
 % Hispanic 7.4 
 % Other 1.6 
Age n 253 
 % < 20 .8 
 % 20-29 36 
 % 30 -39 32.9 
 % 40-49 12.4 
 % 50-59 9.3 
 % > 59 6.6 
Education n 256 
 % Less than High School 0 
 % High School 27.9 
 % Associate Degree 23.6 
 % Bachelor Degree 36.8 
 % Graduate Degree 10.9 
Political Orientation n 258 
 % Liberal 39.1 
 % Moderate 41.9 
 % Conservative 19 
Religiosity n 258 
 % Not Very Religious 60.9 
 % Moderately Religious 15.5 
 % Very Religious 23.6 
Victim of Crime n 258 
 % Yes 21.7 
 % No  74.8 
  % Unsure 3.5 
 
The Retribution Scale, a 5-item scale, was administered after each of the six 
crime scenarios.  It showed moderate internal consistency for each scenario, with 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of greater than .7.  The Consequentialist Scale, a 2-item 
scale, was also administered after each of the six crime vignettes.  It showed moderate 
internal consistency for some crime scenarios, but for others fell below acceptable 
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levels.  Since Cronbach alpha values are sensitive to the number of items in a scale, 
this is not surprising.  For such scales, inter-item correlations (optimally between .2 and 
4) are suggested as an alternative indicator of consistency (Briggs & Cheek, 1986), 
which are shown below in Table 5.27.  However, these values also suggest problematic 
levels of internal consistency on the Consequentialist Scale. 
Table 5.27 
Reliability of Scales 
Scale   Number of 
Items 
Cronbach α Pearson inter-item correlation 
Retribution  5   
 Drug Crime (scenario 1)  .74  
 Drug Crime (scenario 2)  .76  
 Property Crime (scenario 1)  .77  
 Property Crime (scenario 2)  .78  
 Violent Crime (scenario 1)  .78  
 Violent Crime (scenario 2)  .78  
Consequentialist  2   
 Drug Crime (scenario 1)  .76 .61 
 Drug Crime (scenario 2)  .7 .53 
 Property Crime (scenario 1)  .75 .6 
 Property Crime (scenario 2)  .71 .55 
 Violent Crime (scenario 1)  .61 .44 
  Violent Crime (scenario 2)   .59 .42 
 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare participants’ 
scores on both the Retribution Scale and the Consequentialist Scale in response to 
crime vignettes spanning the severity spectrum, from drug crime, to property crime, to 
violent crime.  The means and standard deviations are presented below in Tables 5.28 
and 5.29.  As expected, participants’ mean scores on the Retribution Scale increased 
and dispersion decreased across the crime severity spectrum, with crime severity 
having a significant effect on support for retribution [Wilks’ Lambda=.41, F(2, 
256)=183.9, p<.000, multivariate partial eta squared=.59.]  However, while crime 
severity also had a significant effect on the Consequentialist Scale scores [Wilks’ 
Lambda=.765, F(2, 256)=39.2, p<.000, multivariate partial eta squared=.24.], the data 





Descriptive Statistics for Retribution Scales 
Retribution Scale N Min Max Mean Standard Deviation 
Drug Crime 258 1 7 5 1.2 
Property Crime 248 3 7 5.8 1 
Violent Crime 248 2.5 7 6.3 .9 
 
Table 5.29 
Descriptive Statistics for Consequentialist Scales 
Consequentialist Scale N Min Max Mean Standard Deviation 
Drug Crime 248 1 7 5.3 1.5 
Property Crime 248 1 7 5.5 1.4 
Violent Crime 248 1 7 4.6 1.7 
 
 An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the experimental 
condition (90% White and 10%Black) to a control group (50%White and 50%Black).  
There were no statistically significant differences in scores on any measure, as shown 
in Table 5.30 below. 
Table 5.30 
t-tests Results: Retribution and Consequentialist Scales 
  90% White 10% Black Prison 
Population (N=125)  
50% White 50% Black 
Prison Population (N=133) 
   
  M SD M SD t-
test 
p 
Retribution (drug crime) 5.09 1.06 4.92 1.33 -1.2 .23 
Retribution (property crime) 5.78 1.05 5.83 1.02 -.39 .69 
Retribution (violent crime) 6.27 .98 6.35 .8 -.75 .46 
Consequentialist (drug crime) 5.23 1.61 5.35 1.44 -.66 .51 
Consequentialist (property crime) 5.49 1.45 5.51 1.29 -.15 .88 
Consequentialist (violent crime) 4.74 1.71 4.55 1.69 .86 .39 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
In a follow-up to this experimental study, regression analyses were conducted to 
examine the experimental condition’s effect while statistically controlling for other well-
documented predictors. 
Drug Crime (Retribution Scale) 
 
Standard multiple regression was conducted to test the following explanatory model: 
 




where Y =  support for retribution against drug crime (measured on a 7-point scale); x1 = 
age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree attainment); x3 = political 
ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity (measured on a 10-point scale); 
x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = dummy variable for Hispanic 
relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to White; x8 = dummy variable 
for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for Victimized relative to Never 
Victimized; x10 = experimental condition relative to control); x11 = blame (measured on a 
7-point scale).   To evaluate blame as a mediator, the model was run hierarchically, first 
with it left out of the model and then with it included.  
Table 5.31 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of 
the variables found to be statistically significant, blame was the most strongly correlated 
with support for retribution against drug crime (.59), followed by political ideology (.24), 
religiosity (.21), Asian (.18), victimized (.13), age (.13), and black (-.12).  There were no 
concerning bivariate correlations among the variables indicating collinearity.  This was 
further confirmed by an inspection of collinearity statistics, displayed in Table 5.32, 
which shows Tolerance values above .10 and VIF values less than 10 (Myers, 1990).  
Table 5.31 
Pearson-Product Moment: Drug Crime Retribution 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1: Drug Crime (retribution) —            
2: Age 0.13* —           
3: Education -0.05 0.19*** —          
4: Political Ideology 0.24*** 0.16** -0.04 —         
5: Religiosity 0.21*** 0.17** 0.03 0.46*** —        
6: Black -0.12* -0.19** -0.02 -0.03 0.14* —       
7: Hispanic -0.04 -0.09 0.07 -0.12* -0.06 -0.09 —      
8: Asian 0.18** -0.04 0.12* -0.10* -0.06** -0.09 -0.08 —     
9: Female 0.08 0.09 -0.01 -0.09 0.18 0.00 0.01 -0.06 —    
10: Victimized 0.13* -0.12* 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.02 -0.09 —   
11: Exp Condition 0.08 0.05 0.07 -0.07 0.03 -0.07 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 —  
12:  Blame 0.59*** 0.14* -0.03 0.25*** 0.19** 0.05 -0.07 0.01 -0.03 0.12* 0.06 — 









  Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.83 1.20 
Education 0.92 1.09 
Political Ideology 0.69 1.44 
Religiosity 0.70 1.44 
Black 0.89 1.13 
Hispanic 0.94 1.06 
Asian 0.94 1.06 
Female 0.91 1.10 
Victimized 0.94 1.06 
Exp. Condition 0.97 1.04 
Blame 0.89 1.12 
 
Table 5.33 displays the regression analysis results for both model 1 (all 
predictors except blame) and model 2 (full model).  Model 1 significantly predicted 
support for retribution against drug crime, R2=.17, R2adj =.13, F(10, 254)=4.8, p<.001.  
Overall, it accounted for 17% of the variation.  Three variables were statistically 
significant: Asian had the strongest effect, followed by political ideology and victimized.  
Least-squares yields the following estimates of these coefficients: 
 
Ŷ = 3.9 + 1.0 (Asian) + .13 (Political Ideology) + .42 (Victimized) 
 
Model 2 was also statistically significant, R2=.43, R2adj =.41, F(11, 252)=16.7, 
p<.001.  This model accounted for 43% of the variation, appreciably more than model 1.  
Four variables were statistically significant: blame had the strongest effect, followed by 
Asian, black, and female.  Least-squares yields the following estimates: 
Ŷ = 2.65 + .35 (Blame) + .87 (Asian) - .50 (Black) + .26 (Female) 
 
 The addition of blame had several consequences: it damped the effect of Asian, 
mediated completely the effects of political ideology and victimized, and revealed a 






Hierarchical Regression: Drug Crime Retribution 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Education -0.12 0.07 -0.10 -0.08 0.06 -0.07 
Political Ideology 0.13** 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.04 0.10 
Religiosity 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.07 
Black -0.31 0.25 -0.08 -0.50* 0.21 -0.12 
Hispanic 0.09 0.28 0.02 0.11 0.23 0.02 
Asian 1.00*** 0.27 0.22 0.87*** 0.23 0.19 
Female 0.23 0.15 0.09 0.26* 0.12 0.11 
Victimized 0.42* 0.17 0.15 0.20 0.14 0.07 
Exp. Condition 0.20 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.05 
Blame    0.35*** 0.03 0.54 
R2   0.17   0.43 
Adjusted R2   0.13   0.41 
F    4.85***   16.72*** 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically test the effect of blame as a mediator. 
Based on 10,000 bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path 
analysis, after controlling for covariates in the model, showed that blame does not 
indirectly influence the relationship between the race manipulation and support for 
retribution against drug crime, since the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval includes 
zero, ab= .10, 95% CI [-.05, .26] (Hayes, 2013). 
Figure 5.7 





Property Crime (Retribution Scale) 
 




Y = a0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 + b10X10 + b11X11 + e, 
 
where Y =  support for retribution against property crime (measured on a 7-point scale); 
x1 = age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree attainment); x3 = 
political ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity (measured on a 10-point 
scale); x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = dummy variable for Hispanic 
relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to White; x8 = dummy variable 
for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for Victimized relative to Never 
Victimized; x10 = experimental condition relative to control; x11 = blame (measured on a 
7-point scale).   To evaluate blame as a mediator, the model was run hierarchically, first 
with it left out of the model and then with it included. 
Table 5.34 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of 
the variables found to be statistically significant, blame was the most strongly correlated 
with support for retribution against drug crime (.58), followed by Asian (.19) age (.12), 
and victimized (.12).  There were no concerning bivariate correlations among the 
variables indicating collinearity.  This was further confirmed by an inspection of 
collinearity statistics, displayed in Table 5.35, which shows Tolerance values above .10 
and VIF values less than 10 (Myers, 1990).  
Table 5.34 
Pearson Product-Moment: Property Crime Retribution 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1: Property Crime (retribution)             
2: Age 0.12*            
3: Education -0.08 0.18**           
4: Political Ideology 0.07 0.17** -0.05          
5: Religiosity 0.07 0.17** 0.02 0.46***         
6: Black -0.08 -0.19** -0.02 -0.03 0.14*        
7: Hispanic -0.05 -0.09 0.07 -0.12* -0.06 -0.09       
8: Asian 0.19*** -0.04 0.12* -0.11* -0.06 -0.09 -0.08      
9: Female 0.10 0.10 -0.02 -0.09 0.18** 0.00 0.01 -0.06     
10: Victimized 0.12* -0.11* 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.03 -0.08    
11: Exp Condition 0.02 0.05 0.07 -0.07 0.04 -0.07 0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.06   
12:  Blame 0.58*** 0.20*** 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.08 0.05 0.14* -0.02 0.07  






  Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.81 1.23 
Education 0.93 1.08 
Political Ideology 0.71 1.41 
Religiosity 0.69 1.44 
Black 0.89 1.13 
Hispanic 0.94 1.06 
Asian 0.94 1.06 
Female 0.89 1.12 
Victimized 0.97 1.04 
Exp. Condition 0.97 1.04 
Blame 0.92 1.09 
 
Table 5.36 displays the regression analysis results.  Model 1 significantly 
predicted support for retribution against property crime, R2=.10, R2adj =.07, F(10, 
254)=2.8, p<.003.  Overall, it accounted for 10% of the variation.  Four variables were 
statistically significant: Asian contributed the most, followed by age, victimized, and 
education.  Least-squares yields the following estimates of these coefficients: 
 
Ŷ = 5.27 + .85 (Asian) + .01 (Age) + .33 (Victimized) - .14 (Education) 
 
Model 2 was also statistically significant, R2=.41, R2adj =.39, F(11, 254)=16.7, 
p<.001.  This model accounted for 41% of the variation, appreciably more than model 1.  
Four variables were statistically significant: blame had the strongest effect, followed by 
Asian, education, and female.  Least-squares yields the following estimates: 
Ŷ = .99 + .71 (Blame) + .70 (Asian) - .11 (Education) + .06 (Female) 
 
 The inclusion of blame in the model slightly diminished the effects of Asian and 
education, washed out the effects of victimized and age, and revealed a suppression 







Hierarchical Regression: Property Crime Retribution 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age 0.01* 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Education -0.14* 0.07 -0.13 -0.11* 0.05 -0.11 
Political Ideology 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.09 
Religiosity 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 
Black -0.11 0.23 -0.03 -0.33 0.19 -0.09 
Hispanic 0.02 0.25 0.01 0.15 0.21 0.04 
Asian 0.85*** 0.25 0.22 0.70*** 0.20 0.18 
Female 0.22 0.13 0.11 0.06* 0.11 0.03 
Victimized 0.33* 0.15 0.14 0.31 0.12 0.13 
Exp. Condition 0.06 0.13 0.03 -0.03 0.10 -0.01 
Blame    0.71*** 0.06 0.58 
R2   0.10   0.41 
Adjusted R2   0.07   0.39 
F    2.77**   15.44*** 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically test the effect of blame as a mediator.  
Based on 10,000 bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path 
analysis, after adjusting for covariates in the model, showed that blame does not 
indirectly influence the relationship between the race manipulation and support for 
retribution against property crime, since the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval 
includes zero, ab= .09, 95% CI [-.06, .24] (Hayes, 2013). 
Figure 5.8 
Indirect Effect of Race on Property Crime Retribution via Blame 
 
 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001, N=254. 
 
Violent Crime (Retribution Scale) 
 




Y = a0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 + b10X10 + b11X11 + e, 
 
where Y =  support for retribution against violent crime (measured on a 7-point scale); x1 
= age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree attainment); x3 = 
political ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity (measured on a 10-point 
scale); x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = dummy variable for Hispanic 
relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to White; x8 = dummy variable 
for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for Victimized relative to Never 
Victimized; x10 = experimental condition relative to control; x11 = blame (measured on a 
7-point scale).   To evaluate blame as a mediator, the model was run hierarchically, first 
with it left out of the model and then with it included. 
Table 5.37 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of 
the variables found to be statistically significant, blame was the most strongly correlated 
with support for retribution against drug crime (.63), followed by education, (-.18), Asian 
(.16), and female (.11).  There were no concerning bivariate correlations among the 
variables indicating collinearity.  This was further confirmed by an inspection of 
collinearity statistics, displayed in Table 5.38, which shows Tolerance values above .10 
and VIF values less than 10 (Myers, 1990).  
 
Table 5.37 
Pearson Product-Moment: Violent Crime Retribution 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1: Violent Crime (retribution)             
2: Age 0.08            
3: Education -0.18** 0.19***           
4: Political Ideology 0.05 0.17** -0.06          
5: Religiosity 0.07 0.17** 0.02 0.45***         
6: Black -0.09 -0.18** -0.02 -0.03 0.14*        
7: Hispanic -0.06 -0.09 0.07 -0.12* -0.06 -0.09       
8: Asian 0.16** -0.04 0.12* -0.11* -0.06 -0.09 -0.08      
9: Female 0.11* 0.10 -0.02 -0.08 0.18** -0.01 0.01 -0.06     
10: Victimized 0.06 -0.12* 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.03 -0.08    
11: Exp Condition 0.05 0.05 0.06 -0.08 0.03 -0.07 0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.06   
12:  Blame 0.63*** 0.15** -0.16** -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.12* -0.05 0.08   






  Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.82 1.23 
Education 0.89 1.13 
Political Ideology 0.71 1.40 
Religiosity 0.70 1.43 
Black 0.90 1.12 
Hispanic 0.94 1.06 
Asian 0.94 1.06 
Female 0.90 1.11 
Victimized 0.97 1.04 
Exp. Condition 0.97 1.04 
Blame 0.91 1.10 
 
Table 5.39 displays the regression analysis results.  Model 1 significantly 
predicted support for retribution against violent crime, R2=.11, R2adj =.07, F(10, 254)=3.0, 
p<.001.  Overall, it accounted for 11% of the variation.  Two variables were statistically 
significant: education contributed the most, followed by Asian.  Least-squares yields the 
following estimates of these coefficients: 
 
Ŷ = 6.3 - .20 (Education) + .67 (Asian) 
 
Model 2 was also statistically significant, R2=.46, R2adj =.44, F(11, 252)=18.8, 
p<.001.  This model accounted for 46% of the variation, appreciably more than model 1.  
Two variables were statistically significant: blame had the strongest effect, followed by 
Asian.  Least-squares yields the following estimates: 
Ŷ = 1.15 + .76 (Blame) + .56 (Asian)  
 
 The inclusion of blame in the model diminished the effect of Asian, and 






Hierarchical Regression: Violent Crime Retribution 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
Education -0.20*** 0.06 -0.23 -0.09 0.05 -0.10 
Political Ideology 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.09 
Religiosity 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06 
Black -0.19 0.20 -0.06 -0.22 0.15 -0.07 
Hispanic -0.06 0.22 -0.02 -0.03 0.17 -0.01 
Asian 0.67** 0.21 0.20 0.56*** 0.17 0.17 
Female 0.19 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.05 
Victimized 0.18 0.13 0.09 0.18 0.10 0.09 
Exp. Condition 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.01 
Blame    0.76*** 0.06 0.62 
R2   0.11   0.46 
Adjusted R2   0.07   0.44 
F    3.01***   18.80*** 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically test the effect of blame as a mediator.  
Based on 10,000 bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path 
analysis, after adjusting for covariates in the model, showed that blame does not 
indirectly influence the relationship between the race manipulation and support for 
retribution against violent crime, since the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval 
includes zero, ab= .09, 95% CI [-.05, .24] (Hayes, 2013). 
Figure 5.9 









Standard multiple regression was conducted to test the following explanatory model: 
 
Y = a0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 + b10X10 + b11X11 + e, 
 
where Y =  support a consequentialist response to drug crime (measured on a 7-point 
scale); x1 = age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree attainment); x3 
= political ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity (measured on a 10-
point scale); x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = dummy variable for 
Hispanic relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to White; x8 = dummy 
variable for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for Victimized relative to Never 
Victimized; x10 = experimental condition relative to control; x11 = blame (measured on a 
7-point scale).   To evaluate blame as a mediator, the model was run hierarchically, first 
with it left out of the model and then with it included. 
Table 5.40 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of 
the variables found to be statistically significant, blame was the most strongly correlated 
with support for retribution against drug crime (.17), followed by political ideology, (.17), 
female (.15), and black (.15).  There were no concerning bivariate correlations among 
the variables indicating collinearity.  This was further confirmed by an inspection of 
collinearity statistics, displayed in Table 5.41, which shows Tolerance values above .10 






Pearson Product-Moment: Drug Crime Consequentialist 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1: Drug Crime (consequentialist) —            
2: Age 0.08 —           
3: Education 0.10 0.19** —          
4: Political Ideology -0.17** 0.16** -0.04 —         
5: Religiosity -0.03 0.17** 0.03 0.46*** —        
6: Black 0.15** -0.19** -0.02 -0.03 0.14* —       
7: Hispanic 0.10 -0.09 0.07 -0.12* -0.06 -0.09 —      
8: Asian -0.08 -0.04 0.12* -0.10* -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 —     
9: Female 0.15** 0.09 -0.01 -0.09 0.18** 0.00 0.01 -0.06 —    
10: Victimized -0.03 -0.12* 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.02 -0.09 —   
11: Exp Condition 0.04 0.05 0.07 -0.07 0.03 -0.07 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 —  
12:  Blame 0.17** 0.14* -0.03 0.25*** 0.19** 0.05 -0.07 0.01 -0.03 0.12* 0.06 — 




  Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.83 1.20 
Education 0.92 1.09 
Political Ideology 0.69 1.44 
Religiosity 0.70 1.44 
Black 0.89 1.13 
Hispanic 0.94 1.06 
Asian 0.94 1.06 
Female 0.91 1.10 
Victimized 0.94 1.06 
Exp. Condition 0.97 1.04 
Blame 0.89 1.12 
 
 Table 5.42 displays the regression analysis results.  Model 1 significantly 
predicted support for a consequentialist response to drug crime, R2=.10, R2adj =.07, F(10, 
254)=2.8, p<.003.  Overall, it accounted for 10% of the variation.  Three variables were 
statistically significant: black contributed the most, followed by political ideology and 
female.  Least-squares yields the following estimates of these coefficients: 
 
Ŷ = 4.5 + .94 (Black) - .11 (Political Ideology) + .43 (Female)  
 
Model 2 was also statistically significant, R2=.15, R2adj =.11, F(11, 252)=3.83, 
p<.001.  This model accounted for 15% of the variation, slightly more than model 1.  
Two variables were statistically significant: blame had the strongest effect, followed by 
Asian.  Least-squares yields the following estimates: 




 The inclusion of blame had a negligible effect on the significant predictors in 
model 1.  
 
Hierarchical Regression: Drug Crime Consequentialist  
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age 0.02 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.09 
Education 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.09 
Political Ideology -0.11* 0.06 -0.14 -0.15** 0.06 -0.19 
Religiosity -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 
Black 0.94** 0.34 0.18 0.85* 0.33 0.16 
Hispanic 0.54 0.37 0.09 0.55 0.37 0.09 
Asian -0.41 0.36 -0.07 -0.48 0.36 -0.08 
Female 0.43* 0.20 0.14 0.43* 0.19 0.14 
Victimized 0.04 0.22 0.01 -0.09 0.22 -0.03 
Exp. Condition 0.12 0.19  0.04 0.05 0.19 0.02 
Blame    0.19*** 0.05 0.23 
R2   0.10   0.15 
Adjusted R2   0.07   0.11 
F    2.80**   3.83*** 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically test the effect of blame as a mediator.  
Based on 10,000 bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path 
analysis, after controlling for covariates in the model, showed that blame does not 
indirectly influences the relationship between the race manipulation and a 
consequentialist response to drug crime, since the 95% bias-corrected confidence 
interval includes zero, ab= .05, 95% CI [-.02, .18] (Hayes, 2013). 
Figure 5.10 









Standard multiple regression was conducted to test the following explanatory model: 
 
Y = a0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 + b10X10 + b11X11 + e, 
 
where Y =  support a consequentialist response to property crime (measured on a 7-
point scale); x1 = age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree 
attainment); x3 = political ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity 
(measured on a 10-point scale); x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = 
dummy variable for Hispanic relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to 
White; x8 = dummy variable for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for 
Victimized relative to Never Victimized; x10 = experimental condition; x11 = blame 
(measured on a 7-point scale).   To evaluate blame as a mediator, the model was run 
hierarchically, first with it left out of the model and then with it included. 
Table 5.43 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of 
the variables found to be statistically significant, blame was the most strongly correlated 
with support for retribution against property crime (-.34), followed by blame, (.23), 
female (.16), Asian (-.14), and black (.11).  There were no concerning bivariate 
correlations among the variables indicating collinearity.  This was further confirmed by 
an inspection of collinearity statistics, displayed in Table 5.44, which shows Tolerance 





Pearson Product-Moment: Property Crime Consequentialist 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1: Property Crime (consequentialist) —            
2: Age -0.05 —           
3: Education 0.05 0.18** —          
4: Political Ideology -0.34*** 0.17** -0.05 —         
5: Religiosity -0.09 0.17** 0.02 0.46*** —        
6: Black 0.11* -0.19** -0.02 -0.03 0.14* —       
7: Hispanic 0.02 -0.09 0.07 -0.12* -0.06 -0.09 —      
8: Asian -0.14* -0.04 0.12* -0.11* -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 —     
9: Female 0.16** 0.10 -0.02 -0.09 0.18** 0.00 0.01 -0.06 —    
10: Victimized -0.02 -0.11* 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.06 0.03 -0.08 —   
11: Exp Condition 0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.07 0.04 -0.07 0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 —  
12:  Blame 0.23*** 0.20*** 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.08 0.05 0.14* -0.02 0.07 — 




  Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.81 1.23 
Education 0.93 1.08 
Political Ideology 0.71 1.41 
Religiosity 0.69 1.44 
Black 0.89 1.13 
Hispanic 0.94 1.06 
Asian 0.94 1.06 
Female 0.89 1.12 
Victimized 0.97 1.04 
Exp. Condition 0.97 1.04 
Blame 0.92 1.09 
 
Table 5.45 displays the regression analysis results.  Model 1 significantly 
predicted support for a consequentialist response to property crime, R2=.17, R2adj =.14, 
F(10, 254)=5.1, p<.001.  Overall, it accounted for 17% of the variation.  Two variables 
were significant: political ideology contributed the most, followed by Asian.  Least-
squares yields the following estimates of these coefficients: 
 
Ŷ = 6.02 - .26 (Political Ideology) - .9 (Asian)  
 
Model 2 was also statistically significant, R2=.22, R2adj =.18, F(11, 254)=6.07, 
p<.001.  This model accounted for 22% of the variation, a modest increase from model 
1.  Three variables were statistically significant: political ideology had the strongest 
effect, followed by blame, and Asian.  Least-squares yields the following estimates: 




 The inclusion of blame had a negligible effect on the significant predictors in 
model 1.  
 
Hierarchical Regression: Property Crime Consequentialist 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 
Education 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.07 
Political Ideology -0.26*** 0.05 -0.36 -0.25*** 0.05 -0.35 
Religiosity 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.05 
Black 0.34 0.29 0.07 0.23 0.28 0.05 
Hispanic -0.19 0.32 -0.04 -0.12 0.31 -0.02 
Asian -0.90** 0.31 -0.17 -0.98** 0.31 -0.19 
Female 0.32 0.17 0.12 0.24 0.17 0.09 
Victimized -0.01 0.19 0.00 -0.03 0.18 -0.01 
Exp. Condition -0.01 0.16 0.00 -0.05 0.16 -0.02 
Blame    0.35*** 0.10 0.22 
R2   0.17   0.22 
Adjusted R2   0.14   0.18 
F    5.08***   6.07*** 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically test the effect of blame as a mediator.  
Based on 10,000 bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path 
analysis, after adjusting for covariates in the model, showed that blame does not 
indirectly influence the relationship between the race manipulation and a 
consequentialist response to property crime, since the 95% bias-corrected confidence 
interval includes zero, ab= .04, 95% CI [-.02, .15] (Hayes, 2013). 
Figure 5.11 






Violent Crime (Consequentialist Scale) 
 
Standard multiple regression was conducted to test the following explanatory model: 
 
Y = a0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 + b10X10 + b11X11 + e, 
 
where Y =  support a consequentialist response to violent crime (measured on a 7-point 
scale); x1 = age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree attainment); x3 
= political ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity (measured on a 10-
point scale); x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = dummy variable for 
Hispanic relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to White; x8 = dummy 
variable for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for Victimized relative to Never 
Victimized; x10 = experimental condition relative to control; x11 = blame (measured on a 
7-point scale).   To evaluate blame as a mediator, the model was run hierarchically, first 
with it left out of the model and then with it included. 
Table 5.46 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of 
the variables found to be statistically significant, black was the most strongly correlated 
with support for retribution against violent crime (.16), followed by political ideology (-
.13), and age (-.13).  There were no concerning bivariate correlations among the 
variables indicating collinearity.  This was further confirmed by an inspection of 
collinearity statistics, displayed in Table 5.47, which shows Tolerance values above .10 





Pearson Product-Moment: Violent Crime Consequentialist 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1: Violent Crime (consequentialist) —            
2: Age -0.13* —           
3: Education 0.08 0.19*** —          
4: Political Ideology -0.13* 0.17** -0.06 —         
5: Religiosity 0.03 0.17** 0.02 0.45*** —        
6: Black 0.16** -0.18** -0.02 -0.03 0.14* —       
7: Hispanic 0.03 -0.09 0.07 -0.12* -0.06 -0.09 —      
8: Asian -0.03 -0.04 0.12* -0.11* -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 —     
9: Female -0.01 0.10 -0.02 -0.08 0.18** -0.01 0.01 -0.06 —    
10: Victimized -0.02 -0.12* 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.03 -0.08 —   
11: Exp Condition -0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.08 0.03 -0.07 0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 —  
12:  Blame 0.02 0.15** -0.16** -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.12* -0.05 0.08 — 




  Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.82 1.23 
Education 0.89 1.13 
Political Ideology 0.71 1.40 
Religiosity 0.70 1.43 
Black 0.90 1.12 
Hispanic 0.94 1.06 
Asian 0.94 1.06 
Female 0.90 1.11 
Victimized 0.97 1.04 
Exp. Condition 0.97 1.04 
Blame 0.91 1.10 
 
Table 5.48 displays the regression analysis results.  Model 1 was not statistically 
significant, R2=.07, R2adj =.03, F(10, 254)=1.8, p<.066.  Political ideology was the only 
statistically significant variable in the model.  Nor was model 2 statistically significant, 
R2=.07, R2adj =.03, F(11, 252)=1.72, p<.07.  Once again, political ideology was the only 








Hierarchical Regression: Violent Crime Consequentialist 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age -0.01 0.01 -0.11 -0.02 0.01 -0.13 
Education 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.19 0.11 0.11 
Political Ideology -0.15* 0.07 -0.17 -0.14* 0.07 -0.16 
Religiosity 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.11 
Black 0.62 0.38 0.11 0.63 0.38 0.11 
Hispanic 0.02 0.42 0.00 0.04 0.42 0.01 
Asian -0.28 0.41 -0.04 -0.29 0.41 -0.05 
Female -0.14 0.22 -0.04 -0.13 0.23 -0.04 
Victimized -0.13 0.25 -0.03 -0.15 0.25 -0.04 
Exp. Condition -0.26 0.21 -0.08 -0.26 0.22 -0.08 
Blame    0.14 0.15 0.06 
R2   0.07   0.07 
Adjusted R2   0.03   0.03 
F for change in R2   1.77   1.72 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically test the effect of blame as a mediator.  
Based on 10,000 bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path 
analysis, after adjusting for covariates in the model, showed that blame does not 
indirectly influences the relationship between the race manipulation and a 
consequentialist response to violent crime, since the 95% bias-corrected confidence 
interval includes zero, ab= .02, 95% CI [-.01, .10] (Hayes, 2013). 
Figure 5.12 








Study 4: Free Will Doubt 
 
Drawn from the Mechanical Turk worker pool, this study included 245 participants who 
successfully completed the tasks.  Forty-eight percent of the participants were female 
(n=125) and 46% percent were male (n=118).   Seventy-one percent of participants 
identified as White (n=182), 9% percent as Black (n=22), 7% as Asian (n=17), and 7% 
percent as Hispanic (n=18).  Ages ranged from 18 to 66, with a mean age of 36.5 
(SD=11.4); thirty-three percent of participants were in their 20s (n=85), 30% were in 
their 30s (n=78), 15% in their 40s (n=38), and 12% in their 50s (n=30).  Forty-two 
percent of participants completed a bachelor’s degree (n=107), 27% high school (n=70), 
and 15% an associate’s degree (n=38).  On a single-item measure of political 
orientation, 44% of participants indicated moderate (n=113), 33% percent liberal (n=85), 
and 18% conservative (n=47).  On a single-item measure of religiosity, 49% indicated 
not very religious (n=126), 25% very religious (n=64), and 21% moderately religious 





Demographics of Study 4 Sample 
Characteristic             Total Sample            
Gender   
 n 244 
 % Male 45.7 
 % Female 48.4 
 %Other .4 
Ethnicity n 245 
 % White 70.5 
 % Black  8.5 
 % Asian 6.6 
 % Hispanic 7.0 
 % Other 2.3 
Age n 258 
 % < 20 .8 
 % 20-29 32.9 
 % 30 -39 30.2 
 % 40-49 14.7 
 % 50-59 11.6 
 % > 59 3.1 
Education n 244 
 % Less than High School .4 
 % High School 27.1 
 % Associate Degree 14.7 
 % Bachelor Degree 41.5 
 % Graduate Degree 10.9 
Political Orientation n 245 
 % Liberal 34.7 
 % Moderate 46.1 
 % Conservative 19.2 
Religiosity n 245 
 % Not Very Religious 48.8 
 % Moderately Religious 21.3 
 % Very Religious 24.8 
Victim of Crime n 245 
 % Yes 20.9 
 % No  68.6 
  % Unsure 5.4 
 
The Retribution Scale, a 5-item scale, was administered after each of the six 
crime scenarios.  It showed moderate internal consistency for each scenario, with 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of greater than .7.  The Consequentialist Scale, a 2-item 
scale, was also administered after each of the six crime vignettes.  It showed moderate 
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internal consistency for some crime scenarios, but for others fell below acceptable 
levels.  Since Cronbach alpha values are sensitive to the number of items in a scale, 
this is not surprising.  For such scales, inter-item correlations (optimally between .2 and 
.4) are suggested as an alternative indicator of consistency (Briggs & Cheek, 1986), 
which are shown below in Table 5.50.  However, these values also suggest problematic 
levels of internal consistency on the Consequentialist Scale. 
Table 5.50 
Reliability of Scales 
Scale   Number of Items Cronbach α Pearson inter-item correlation 
Retribution  5   
 Drug Crime (scenario 1)  .74  
 Drug Crime (scenario 2)  .76  
 Property Crime (scenario 1)  .77  
 Property Crime (scenario 2)  .78  
 Violent Crime (scenario 1)  .78  
 Violent Crime (scenario 2)  .78  
Consequentialist  2   
 Drug Crime (scenario 1)  .76 .65 
 Drug Crime (scenario 2)  .7 .5 
 Property Crime (scenario 1)  .75 .46 
 Property Crime (scenario 2)  .71 .54 
 Violent Crime (scenario 1)  .61 .44 
  Violent Crime (scenario 2)   .59 .34 
FAD-Plus Subscale  7 .82  
 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare participants’ 
scores on both the Retribution Scale and the Consequentialist Scale in response to 
crime vignettes spanning the severity spectrum, from drug crime, to property crime, to 
violent crime.  The means and standard deviations are presented in below in Tables 
5.51 and 5.52.  As expected, participants’ mean scores on the Retribution Scale 
increased and dispersion decreased across the crime severity spectrum, with crime 
severity having a significant effect on support for retribution [Wilks’ Lambda=.45, F(2, 
243)=150.4, p<.000, multivariate partial eta squared=.55.]  However, while crime 
severity also had a significant effect on the Consequentialist Scale scores [Wilks’ 
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Lambda=.79, F(2, 243)=33.3, p<.000, multivariate partial eta squared=.22.], the data 
indicated no clear pattern in relation to the crime severity spectrum. 
Table 5.51 
Descriptive Statistics for Retribution Scales 
Retribution Scale N Min Max Mean Standard Deviation 
Drug Crime 245 1.2 7 5 1.2 
Property Crime 245 1.2 7 5.7 1.09 
Violent Crime 245 1.4 7 6.2 1.07 
 
Table 5.52 
Descriptive Statistics for Consequentialist Scales 
Consequentialist Scale N Min Max Mean Standard Deviation 
Drug Crime 245 1 7 5.34 1.5 
Property Crime 245 1 7 5.39 1.4 
Violent Crime 245 1 7 4.65 1.6 
 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the experimental condition 
(anti-free-will) to a control group. There were no significant differences in scores on any 
measure, as shown in Table 5.53 below. 
Table 5.53 
t-tests Results: Retribution and Consequentialist Scales 





   
  M SD M SD t-test p 
Retribution (drug crime) 5.02 1.14 4.97 1.26 .35 0.73 
Retribution (property crime) 5.73 .96 5.73 1.22 -.039 0.97 
Retribution (violent crime) 6.19 0.96 6.12 1.18 .52 0.60 
Consequentialist (drug crime) 5.35 1.40 5.33 1.59 .122 0.90 
Consequentialist (property crime) 5.39 1.32 5.40 1.43 -.022 0.98 
Consequentialist (violent crime) 4.61 1.59 4.70 1.66 -.435 0.66 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
In a follow-up to this experimental study, regression analyses were conducted to 
examine the experimental condition’s effect while statistically controlling for other 
explanatory variables. 
Drug Crime (Retribution Scale) 
 
Standard multiple regression was conducted to test the following explanatory model: 
 




where Y =  support for retribution against drug crime (measured on a 7-point scale); x1 = 
age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree attainment); x3 = political 
ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity (measured on a 10-point scale); 
x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = dummy variable for Hispanic 
relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to White; x8 = dummy variable 
for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for Victimized relative to Never 
Victimized; x10 = experimental condition in relation to control; x11 = free will doubt 
(measured on a 5-point scale); x12 = blame (measured on a 7-point scale).   To evaluate 
blame as a mediator, the model was run hierarchically, first with it left out of the model 
and then with it included. 
Table 5.54 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of 
the variables found to be statistically significant, blame was the most strongly correlated 
with support for retribution against drug crime (.56), followed by free-will doubt (-.44), 
political ideology (.30), religiosity (.30), age (.16), and black (.11).  There were no 
concerning bivariate correlations among the variables indicating collinearity.  This was 
further confirmed by an inspection of collinearity statistics, displayed in Table 5.55, 
which shows Tolerance values above .10 and VIF values less than 10 (Myers, 1990).  
Table 5.54 
Pearson Product-Moment: Drug Crime Retribution 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1: Drug Crime (retribution) —             
2: Age 0.16** —            
3: Education 0.01 0.01 —           
4: Political Ideology 0.30*** -0.02 -0.17** —          
5: Religiosity 0.30*** 0.09 0.03 0.35*** —         
6: Black 0.11* -0.04 -0.03 0.08 0.15** —        
7: Hispanic 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 0.08 -0.03 -0.09 —       
8: Asian -0.04 -0.12* 0.10* -0.07 0.03 -0.09 -0.08 —      
9: Female 0.09 0.15* 0.04 -0.09 0.14* -0.04 -0.02 0.04 —     
10: Victimized 0.00 0.01 -0.17** 0.11* 0.05 0.18** 0.05 -0.03 0.11* —    
11: Condition 0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.09* -0.02 0.07 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.05 —   
12: FWD -0.44*** -0.01 0.08 -0.35*** -0.29*** -0.23*** -0.01 0.08 -0.07 -0.13* -0.03 —  
13:  Blame 0.56*** 0.18** 0.00 0.19** 0.24*** 0.18** -0.05 -0.04 0.13* 0.06 0.11* -0.38*** — 






 Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.92 1.09 
Education 0.92 1.08 
Political Ideology 0.75 1.33 
Religiosity 0.79 1.28 
Black 0.88 1.14 
Hispanic 0.96 1.04 
Asian 0.95 1.06 
Female 0.91 1.10 
Victimized 0.92 1.09 
FWD 0.73 1.38 
Blame 0.79 1.26 
 
Table 5.56 displays the regression analysis results for both model 1 (all 
predictors except blame) and model 2 (full model).  Model 1 significantly predicted 
support for retribution against drug crime, R2=.27, R2adj =.23, F(11, 243)=7.7, p<.001.  
Overall, it accounted for 27% of the variation.  Four variables were statistically 
significant: free-will doubt contributed the most, followed by political Ideology, age, and 
religiosity.  Least-squares yields the following estimates of these coefficients: 
 
Ŷ = 1.71 - .53 (Free Will Doubt) + .10 (Political Ideology) +.02 (Age) + .04 (Religiosity) 
 
Model 2 was also statistically significant, R2=.41, R2adj =.38, F(12, 243)=13.24, 
p<.001.  This model accounted for 41% of the variation, an appreciable increase from 
model 1.  Three variables were statistically significant: blame had the strongest effect, 
followed by free-will doubt, and political ideology.  Least-squares yields the following 
estimates: 
Ŷ = 1.28 + .30 (Blame) - .34 (Free-will doubt) + .08 (Political Ideology) 
 
 The inclusion of blame had several consequences. It completely mediated the 
effects of both age and religiosity, considerably diminished the effect of free-will doubt, 





Hierarchical Regression: Drug Crime Retribution 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age 0.02* 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.08 
Education 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.03 
Political Ideology 0.10* 0.04 0.15 0.08* 0.04 0.13 
Religiosity 0.04* 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.02 0.09 
Black 0.10 0.25 0.02 -0.08 0.23 -0.02 
Hispanic 0.07 0.27 0.01 0.12 0.24 0.03 
Asian 0.01 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 
Female 0.10 0.14 0.04 0.01 0.13 0.01 
Victimized -0.21 0.17 -0.07 -0.19 0.15 -0.07 
Condition 0.02 0.14 0.01 -0.07 0.12 -0.03 
FWD -0.53*** 0.10 -0.35 -0.34*** 0.09 -0.22 
Blame    0.30*** 0.04 0.42 
R2   0.27   0.41 
Adjusted R2   0.23   0.38 
F    7.71**   13.24*** 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically test the effect of blame as a mediator.  
Based on 10,000 bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path 
analysis, after adjusting for covariates in the model, showed that blame indirectly 
influences the relationship between free-will belief and support for retribution against 
drug crime, because the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval does not include zero, 
ab= -.20 (95% CI [-.32, -.11]) (Hayes, 2013).  This finding accounts for nearly half of the 
total effect, Pm =.38 (ab/ab + c'), elucidating the process by which free-will doubt affects 
support for retribution against drug crime. 
Figure 5.13 





Property Crime (Retribution Scale) 
 
Standard multiple regression was conducted to test the following explanatory model: 
 
Y = a0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 + b10X10 + b11X11 + b12X12 e, 
 
where Y =  support for retribution against property crime (measured on a 7-point scale); 
x1 = age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree attainment); x3 = 
political ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity (measured on a 10-point 
scale); x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = dummy variable for Hispanic 
relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to White; x8 = dummy variable 
for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for Victimized relative to Never 
Victimized; x10 = experimental condition in relation to control; x11 = free will doubt 
(measured on a 5-point scale); x12 = blame (measured on a 7-point scale).   To evaluate 
blame as a mediator, the model was run hierarchically, first with it left out of the model 
and then with it included. 
Table 5.57 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of 
the variables found to be statistically significant, blame was the most strongly correlated 
with support for retribution against property crime (.70), followed by free-will doubt (-
.50), political ideology (.16), black (.16) age (.15), religiosity (.13), and victimized (.11).  
There were no concerning bivariate correlations among the variables indicating 
collinearity.  This was further confirmed by an inspection of collinearity statistics, 
displayed in Table 5.58, which shows Tolerance values above .10 and VIF values less 





Pearson Product-Moment: Property Crime Retribution 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1: Property Crime 
(retribution) 
—             
2: Age 0.15** —            
3: Education -0.04 0.00 —           
4: Political Ideology 0.16** -0.02 -0.17** —          
5: Religiosity 0.13* 0.09 0.02 0.36*** —         
6: Black 0.16** -0.04 -0.02 0.08 0.17** —        
7: Hispanic -0.02 -0.06 -0.07 0.08 -0.01 -0.08 —       
8: Asian -0.01 -0.12* 0.10 -0.07 0.03 -0.09 -0.07 —      
9: Female 0.07 0.15* 0.04 -0.09 0.14* -0.05 -0.01 0.04 —     
10: Victimized 0.11* 0.01 -0.17** 0.11* 0.06 0.16** 0.06 -0.03 0.10 —    
11: Condition 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.09 -0.02 0.06 0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.04 —   
12: FWD -0.50*** -0.01 0.08 -0.36*** -0.30*** -0.21*** -0.04 0.08 -0.06 -0.11* -0.03 —  
13:  Blame 0.70*** 0.24*** -0.08 0.04 0.07 0.13* -0.05 -0.03 0.14* 0.08 0.10 -0.42*** — 




  Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.88 1.13 
Education 0.92 1.09 
Political Ideology 0.75 1.34 
Religiosity 0.79 1.27 
Black 0.89 1.13 
Hispanic 0.96 1.04 
Asian 0.95 1.06 
Female 0.91 1.10 
Victimized 0.92 1.09 
FWD 0.65 1.55 
Blame 0.72 1.38 
 
  Table 5.59 displays the regression analysis results.  Model 1 significantly 
predicted support for retribution against property crime, R2=.28, R2adj =.25, F(11, 
243)=8.3, p<.001.  Overall, it accounted for 28% of the variation. Two variables were 
statistically significant: free-will doubt contributed the most, followed by age.  Least-
squares yields the following estimates of these coefficients: 
 
Ŷ = 2.62 - .68 (Free Will Doubt) + .02 (Age) 
 
Model 2 was also statistically significant, R2=.55, R2adj =.52, F(12, 243)=23.47, 
p<.001.  This model accounted for more than one-half (55%) of the variation, an 
appreciable increase from model 1.  Two variables were statistically significant: blame 
84 
 
had the strongest effect, followed by free-will doubt.  Least-squares yields the following 
estimates: 
Ŷ = .22 + .64 (Blame) - .30 (Free-will doubt) 
 
 The inclusion of blame completely mediated the effect of age, and strongly  
attenuated the effect of free-will doubt. 
Table 5.59 
Hierarchical regression: Property Crime Retribution 
 Model  1 Model  2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age 0.02** 0.01 0.16 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Education 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Political Ideology 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.07 
Religiosity -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.01 
Black 0.21 0.22 0.06 0.14 0.18 0.04 
Hispanic -0.14 0.24 -0.03 0.00 0.20 0.00 
Asian 0.23 0.24 0.05 0.13 0.20 0.03 
Female 0.04 0.13 0.02 -0.06 0.10 -0.03 
Victimized 0.11 0.15 0.04 0.09 0.12 0.04 
Condition -0.04 0.12 -0.02 -0.15 0.10 -0.07 
FWD -0.68*** 0.09 -0.49 -0.30*** 0.08 -0.22 
Blame    0.64*** 0.06 0.61 
R2   0.28   0.55 
Adjusted R2   0.25   0.52 
F    8.30***   23.06*** 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically test the effect of blame as a mediator.  
Based on 10,000 bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path 
analysis, after adjusting for covariates in the model, showed that blame indirectly 
influences the relationship between free-will belief and support for retribution against 
property crime, since the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval does not include zero, 
ab= -.38 (95% CI [-.54, -.25]) (Hayes, 2013).  This finding accounts for more than half of 










Violent Crime (Retribution Scale) 
 
Standard multiple regression was conducted to test the following explanatory model: 
 
Y = a0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 + b10X10 + b11X11 + b12X12 e, 
 
where Y =  support for retribution against violent crime (measured on a 7-point scale); x1 
= age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree attainment); x3 = 
political ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity (measured on a 10-point 
scale); x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = dummy variable for Hispanic 
relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to White; x8 = dummy variable 
for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for Victimized relative to Never 
Victimized; x10 = experimental condition in relation to control; x11 = free will doubt 
(measured on a 5-point scale); x12 = blame (measured on a 7-point scale).   To evaluate 
blame as a mediator, the model was run hierarchically, first with it left out of the model 
and then with it included. 
Table 5.60 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of 
the variables found to be statistically significant, blame was the most strongly correlated 
with support for retribution against violent crime (.77), followed by free-will doubt (-.45), 
black (.16), political ideology (.14), religiosity (.13), age (.13), and victimized (.11).  
86 
 
There were no concerning bivariate correlations among the variables indicating 
collinearity.  This was further confirmed by an inspection of collinearity statistics, 
displayed in Table 5.61, which shows Tolerance values above .10 and VIF values less 
than 10 (Myers, 1990).  
Table 5.60 
Pearson Product-Moment: Violent Crime Retribution 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1: Violent Crime (retribution) —             
2: Age 0.13* —            
3: Education -0.08 0.01 —           
4: Political Ideology 0.14* -0.02 -0.17** —          
5: Religiosity 0.13* 0.09 0.03 0.35*** —         
6: Black 0.16** -0.04 -0.03 0.08 0.15** —        
7: Hispanic -0.04 -0.07 -0.08 0.08 -0.03 -0.09 —       
8: Asian 0.02 -0.12* 0.11* -0.07 0.03 -0.09 -0.08 —      
9: Female 0.08 0.15* 0.04 -0.09 0.14* -0.04 -0.02 0.04 —     
10: Victimized 0.11* 0.01 -0.17** 0.11* 0.05 0.18** 0.05 -0.03 0.11* —    
11: Condition 0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.09 -0.02 0.07 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.05 —   
12: FWD -0.45*** -0.01 0.08 -0.35*** -0.30*** -0.23*** -0.01 0.08 -0.08 -0.13* -0.03 —  
13:  Blame 0.77*** 0.18** -0.09 0.05 0.05 0.13* -0.04 -0.02 0.09 0.12* 0.05 -0.37*** — 




  Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.91 1.10 
Education 0.92 1.09 
Political Ideology 0.75 1.34 
Religiosity 0.79 1.27 
Black 0.89 1.12 
Hispanic 0.96 1.04 
Asian 0.95 1.06 
Female 0.92 1.09 
Victimized 0.91 1.10 
FWD 0.70 1.44 
Blame 0.81 1.24 
 
Table 5.62 displays the regression analysis results.  Model 1 significantly 
predicted support for retribution against violent crime, R2=.23, R2adj =.20, F(11, 243)=6.3, 
p<.001.  Overall, it accounted for 23% of the variation.  Two variables were statistically 
significant: blame contributed the most, followed by free-will doubt.  Least-squares 
yields the following estimates of these coefficients: 
 




Model 2 was also statistically significant, R2=.63, R2adj =.61, F(12, 243)=32.89, 
p<.001.  This model accounted for nearly two-thirds (63%) of the variation, a marked 
increase from model 1.  Two variables were statistically significant: blame had the 
strongest effect, followed by free-will doubt.  Least-squares yields the following 
estimates: 
Ŷ = .32 + .74 (Blame) - .22 (Free-will doubt) 
 
 The inclusion of blame completely mediated the effect of age, and strongly  
attenuated the effect of free-will doubt. 
Table 5.62 
Hierarchical Regression: Violent Crime Retribution 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age 0.01* 0.01 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Education -0.05 0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 
Political Ideology -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Religiosity -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Black 0.25 0.23 0.07 0.12 0.16 0.03 
Hispanic -0.14 0.25 -0.03 -0.04 0.17 -0.01 
Asian 0.36 0.25 0.09 0.24 0.17 0.06 
Female 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.09 0.00 
Victimized 0.09 0.16 0.03 -0.03 0.11 -0.01 
Condition 0.04 0.13 0.02 -0.02 0.09 -0.01 
FWD -0.59*** 0.09 -0.44 -0.22*** 0.07 -0.17 
Blame    0.74*** 0.05 0.70 
R2   0.23   0.63 
Adjusted R2   0.20   0.61 
F   6.34***   32.89*** 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically test the effect of blame as a mediator.  
Based on 10,000 bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path 
analysis, after adjusting for the covariates in the full regression model, showed that 
blame indirectly influences the relationship between free-will belief and support for 
retribution against violent crime, since the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval does 
not include zero, ab= -.37 (95 % CI [-.56, -.20]) (Hayes, 2013).  This finding accounts for 










Drug Crime (Consequentialist Scale) 
 
Standard multiple regression was conducted to test the following explanatory model: 
Y = a0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 + b10X10 + b11X11 + b12X12 e, 
 
where Y =  support for a consequentialist response to drug crime (measured on a 7-
point scale); x1 = age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree 
attainment); x3 = political ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity 
(measured on a 10-point scale); x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = 
dummy variable for Hispanic relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to 
White; x8 = dummy variable for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for 
Victimized relative to Never Victimized; x10 = experimental condition in relation to 
control; x11 = free will doubt (measured on a 5-point scale); x12 = blame (measured on a 
7-point scale).   To evaluate blame as a mediator, the model was run hierarchically, first 
with it left out of the model and then with it included. 
Table 5.63 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of 
the variables found to be statistically significant, blame was the most strongly correlated 
with support for a consequentialist response to drug crime (.24), followed by political 
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ideology (-.17), female (.14), and black (.10).  There were no concerning bivariate 
correlations among the variables indicating collinearity.  This was further confirmed by 
an inspection of collinearity statistics, displayed in Table 5.64, which shows Tolerance 
values above .10 and VIF values less than 10 (Myers, 1990).  
Table 5.63 
Pearson Product-Moment: Drug Crime Consequentialist 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1: Drug Crime 
(consequentialist) 
—             
2: Age 0.04 —            
3: Education 0.04 0.01 —           
4: Political Ideology -0.17** -0.02 -0.17** —          
5: Religiosity 0.06 0.09 0.03 0.35*** —         
6: Black 0.10* -0.04 -0.03 0.08 0.15* —        
7: Hispanic -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 0.08 -0.03 -0.09 —       
8: Asian 0.00 -0.12* 0.11* -0.07 0.03 -0.09 -0.08 —      
9: Female 0.14* 0.15* 0.04 -0.09 0.14* -0.04 -0.02 0.04 —     
10: Victimized 0.07 0.01 -0.17** 0.11* 0.05 0.18** 0.05 -0.03 0.11* —    
11: Condition 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.09 -0.02 0.07 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.05 —   
12: FWD -0.05 -0.01 0.08 -0.35*** -0.30*** -0.23*** -0.01 0.08 -0.08 -0.13* -0.03 —  
13:  Blame 0.24*** 0.18** 0.01 0.19** 0.24*** 0.18** -0.05 -0.04 0.13* 0.06 0.11* -0.38*** — 




 Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.92 1.09 
Education 0.92 1.08 
Political Ideology 0.75 1.33 
Religiosity 0.79 1.28 
Black 0.88 1.14 
Hispanic 0.96 1.04 
Asian 0.95 1.06 
Female 0.91 1.10 
Victimized 0.92 1.09 
FWD 0.73 1.38 
Blame 0.79 1.26 
 
Table 5.65 displays the regression analysis results.  Model 1 was not statistically 
significant, R2=.08, R2adj =.04, F(11, 243)=1.8, p<.055; however, there was one 
statistically significant variable, political ideology.  In contrast, model 2 was statistically 
significant, R2=.13, R2adj =.08, F(12, 243)=2.81, p<.001.  This model accounted for a 
modest 13% of the variation.  Two variables were statistically significant: blame had the 




Ŷ = 4.7 + .22 (Blame) - .20 (Political Ideology) 
 
 The inclusion of blame had a negligible effect on the only significant variable in 
model 1, political ideology. Also, though free-will doubt was not statistically significant, 
its effect was almost completely washed out after controlling for blame.  
Table 5.65 
Hierarchical Regression: Drug Crime Consequentialist 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.03 
Education 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 
Political Ideology -0.19** 0.06 -0.23 -0.20*** 0.06 -0.24 
Religiosity 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.06 
Black 0.42 0.35 0.08 0.29 0.34 0.06 
Hispanic -0.27 0.38 -0.05 -0.23 0.37 -0.04 
Asian -0.07 0.38 -0.01 -0.08 0.37 -0.01 
Female 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.24 0.19 0.08 
Victimized 0.21 0.24 0.06 0.23 0.23 0.06 
Condition 0.07 0.19 0.02 0.00 0.19 0.00 
FWD -0.13 0.13 -0.07 0.01 0.14 0.01 
Blame    0.22*** 0.06 0.25 
R2   0.08   0.13 
Adjusted R2   0.04   0.08 
F    1.80   2.81*** 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically test the effect of blame as a mediator.  
Based on 10,000 bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path 
analysis, after adjusting for the covariates in the full regression model, showed that 
blame indirectly influences the relationship between free-will belief and support for a 
consequentialist response to drug crime, as the 95% bias-corrected confidence interval 
does not include zero, ab= -.15 (95% CI [-.27, -.06]) (Hayes, 2013).  This finding 
accounts for 88% of the total effect, Pm =.88 (ab/ab + c').  Given there was no direct 
association between free-will doubt and support for a consequentialist response to drug 
crime, it bears noting that an indirect effect is nonetheless possible; the total effect of 
free-will doubt on support for a consequentialist response to drug crime is the sum of 
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myriad different paths of influence, both direct and indirect, some of which may not be 
accounted for by the model (Hayes, 2009).   
Figure 5.16 





Property Crime (Consequentialist Scale) 
 
Standard multiple regression was conducted to test the following explanatory model: 
 
Y = a0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 + b10X10 + b11X11 + b12X12 e, 
 
where Y =  support for a consequentialist response to property crime (measured on a 7-
point scale); x1 = age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree 
attainment); x3 = political ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity 
(measured on a 10-point scale); x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = 
dummy variable for Hispanic relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to 
White; x8 = dummy variable for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for 
Victimized relative to Never Victimized; x10 = experimental condition in relation to 
control; x11 = free will doubt (measured on a 5-point scale); x12 = blame (measured on a 
7-point scale).  To evaluate blame as a mediator, the model was run hierarchically, first 
with it left out of the model and then with it included. 
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Table 5.66 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of 
the variables found to be statistically significant, political ideology was the most strongly 
correlated with support for a consequentialist response to property crime (-.33), followed 
by blame (.21), female (.13), and victimized (.11).  There were no concerning bivariate 
correlations among the variables indicating collinearity.  This was further confirmed by 
an inspection of collinearity statistics, displayed in Table 5.67, which shows Tolerance 
values above .10 and VIF values less than 10 (Myers, 1990).  
Table 5.66 
Pearson Product-Moment: Property Crime Consequentialist  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1: Property Crime 
(consequentialist) 
—             
2: Age 0.06 —            
3: Education -0.09 0.00 —           
4: Political Ideology -0.33*** -0.02 -0.17** —          
5: Religiosity -0.05 0.09 0.02 0.36*** —         
6: Black 0.10 -0.04 -0.02 0.08 0.17** —        
7: Hispanic -0.09 -0.06 -0.07 0.08 -0.01 -0.08 —       
8: Asian 0.02 -0.12* 0.10 -0.07 0.03 -0.09 -0.07 —      
9: Female 0.13* 0.15* 0.04 -0.09 0.14* -0.05 -0.01 0.04 —     
10: Victimized 0.11* 0.01 -0.17** 0.11* 0.06 0.16** 0.06 -0.03 0.10 —    
11: Condition -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.09 -0.02 0.06 0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.04 —   
12: FWD 0.05 -0.01 0.08 -0.36*** -0.30*** -0.21*** -0.04 0.08 -0.06 -0.11* -0.03 —  
13:  Blame 0.21*** 0.24*** -0.08 0.04 0.07 0.13* -0.05 -0.03 0.14* 0.08 0.10 -0.42*** — 





  Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.88 1.13 
Education 0.92 1.09 
Political Ideology 0.75 1.34 
Religiosity 0.79 1.27 
Black 0.89 1.13 
Hispanic 0.96 1.04 
Asian 0.95 1.06 
Female 0.91 1.10 
Victimized 0.92 1.09 
FWD 0.65 1.55 
Blame 0.72 1.38 
 
Table 5.68 displays the regression analysis results.  Model 1 was statistically 
significant, R2=.18, R2adj =.14, F(11, 43)=4.5, p<.001.  Overall, it accounted for 18% of 
the variation.  Two variables were statistically significant: political ideology contributed 
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the most, followed by education.  Least-squares yields the following estimates of these 
coefficients: 
Ŷ = 6.47 - .28 (Political Ideology) - .019 (Education) 
 
Model 2 was also statistically significant, R2=.21, R2adj =.17, F(12, 243)=5.0, 
p<.001.  This model accounted for 21% of the variation.  Three variables were 
statistically significant: political ideology had the strongest effect, followed by blame, and 
education.  Least-squares yields the following estimates: 
Ŷ = 5.42 - .27 (Political Ideology) + .28 (Blame) - .17 (Education) 
 
 The inclusion of blame had a negligible effect on the two significant variables in 
model 1, political ideology and education. 
Table 5.68 
Hierarchical Regression: Property Crime Consequentialist 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
Education -0.19* 0.08 -0.14 -0.17* 0.08 -0.13 
Political Ideology -0.28*** 0.05 -0.38 -0.27*** 0.05 -0.36 
Religiosity 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.06 
Black 0.50 0.30 0.10 0.45 0.31 0.09 
Hispanic -0.34 0.33 -0.06 -0.30 0.33 -0.05 
Asian 0.09 0.33 0.02 0.05 0.33 0.01 
Female 0.24 0.17 0.09 0.19 0.17 0.07 
Victimized 0.34 0.21 0.10 0.33 0.20 0.10 
Condition 0.04 0.17 0.01 -0.01 0.17 -0.01 
FWD -0.04 0.12 -0.02 0.13 0.13 0.07 
Blame    0.28** 0.09 0.21 
R2   0.18   0.21 
Adjusted R2   0.14   0.17 
F    4.48***   5.02*** 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically test the effect of blame as a mediator.  
Based on 10,000 bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path 
analysis, after adjusting for the covariates in the full regression model, showed that 
blame indirectly influences the relationship between free-will belief and support for a 
consequentialist response to property crime, since the 95% bias-corrected confidence 
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interval does not include zero, ab= -.17 (95% CI [-.30, -.05]) (Hayes, 2013).  This finding 
accounts for the entire effect, Pm = 4.25 (ab/ab + c'). 
 
Figure 5.17 




Violent Crime (Consequentialist Scale) 
 
Standard multiple regression was conducted to test the following explanatory model: 
 
Y = a0 + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5 + b6X6 + b7X7 + b8X8 + b9X9 + b10X10 + b11X11 + b12X12 e, 
 
where Y =  support for a consequentialist response to violent crime (measured on a 7-
point scale); x1 = age (measured in years); x2 = education (measured by degree 
attainment); x3 = political ideology (measured on a 7-point scale); x4 = religiosity 
(measured on a 10-point scale); x5 = dummy variable for Black relative to White; x6 = 
dummy variable for Hispanic relative to White; x7 = dummy variable for Asian relative to 
White; x8 = dummy variable for Female relative to Male; x9 = dummy variable for 
Victimized relative to Never Victimized; x10 = experimental condition in relation to 
control; x11 = free will doubt (measured on a 5-point scale); x12 = blame (measured on a 
7-point scale).   To evaluate blame as a mediator, the model was run hierarchically, first 
with it left out of the model and then with it included. 
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Table 5.69 contains a correlation matrix of variables included in the model.  Of 
the variables found to be statistically significant, political ideology was the most strongly 
correlated with support for a consequentialist response to violent crime (-.26), followed 
by free-will doubt (.12), and religiosity (-.10).  There were no concerning bivariate 
correlations among the variables indicating collinearity.  This was further confirmed by 
an inspection of collinearity statistics, displayed in Table 5.70, which shows Tolerance 
values above .10 and VIF values less than 10 (Myers, 1990).  
 
Table 5.69 
Pearson Product-Moment: Violent Crime Consequentialist 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1: Violent Crime 
(consequentialist) 
—             
2: Age -0.07 —            
3: Education -0.04 0.01 —           
4: Political Ideology -0.26*** -0.02 -0.17** —          
5: Religiosity -0.10* 0.09 0.03 0.35*** —         
6: Black 0.07 -0.04 -0.03 0.08 0.15** —        
7: Hispanic 0.02 -0.07 -0.08 0.08 -0.03 -0.09 —       
8: Asian 0.08 -0.12* 0.11* -0.07 0.03 -0.09 -0.08 —      
9: Female 0.07 0.15* 0.04 -0.09 0.14* -0.04 -0.02 0.04 —     
10: Victimized 0.09 0.01 -0.17** 0.11* 0.05 0.18** 0.05 -0.03 0.11* —    
11: Condition -0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.09 -0.02 0.07 0.03 -0.07 -0.03 0.05 —   
12: FWD 0.12* -0.01 0.08 -0.35*** -0.30*** -0.23*** -0.01 0.08 -0.08 -0.13* -0.03 —  
13:  Blame -0.01 0.18** -0.09 0.05 0.05 0.13* -0.04 -0.02 0.09 0.12* 0.05 -0.37*** — 




  Collinearity Statistics 
Variable Tolerance VIF 
Age 0.91 1.10 
Education 0.92 1.09 
Political Ideology 0.75 1.34 
Religiosity 0.79 1.27 
Black 0.89 1.12 
Hispanic 0.96 1.04 
Asian 0.95 1.06 
Female 0.92 1.09 
Victimized 0.91 1.10 
FWD 0.70 1.44 
Blame 0.81 1.24 
  
Table 5.71 displays the regression analysis results.  Model 1 was statistically 
significant,  R2=.11, R2adj =.07, F(11, 243)=2.6, p<.004.  Overall, it accounted for a 
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modest 11% of the variation.  There was only one statistically significant variable, 
political ideology.  Least-squares yields the following estimate of this coefficient: 
Ŷ = 6.5 - .23 (Political Ideology) 
 
Model 2 was also statistically significant, R2=.11, R2adj =.06, F(12, 243)=2.3, 
p<.007.  This model also accounted for 11% of the variation, with political ideology 
being the only statistically significant variable.  Least-squares yields the following 
estimates: 
Ŷ = 6.5 - .23 (Political Ideology) 
 
 After adjusting for blame, the effect of political ideology was undiminished. 
Table 5.71 
Hierarchical Regression: Violent Crime Consequentialist 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B SE β B SE β 
Age -0.01 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 
Education -0.12 0.10 -0.08 -0.12 0.10 -0.08 
Political Ideology -0.23*** 0.06 -0.26 -0.23*** 0.06 -0.26 
Religiosity -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 
Black 0.52 0.37 0.09 0.52 0.37 0.09 
Hispanic 0.22 0.40 0.04 0.22 0.40 0.04 
Asian 0.40 0.41 0.06 0.39 0.41 0.06 
Female 0.19 0.21 0.06 0.19 0.21 0.06 
Victimized 0.37 0.25 0.09 0.37 0.25 0.09 
Condition -0.04 0.20 -0.01 -0.05 0.20 -0.01 
FWD 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.15 0.07 
Blame    0.02 0.11 0.01 
R2   0.11   0.11 
Adjusted R2   0.07   0.06 
F    2.57**   2.35** 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
Bootstrapping was also used to empirically test the effect of blame as a mediator.  
Based on 10,000 bootstrap samples and replacements, an OLS simple mediation path 
analysis, after adjusting for the covariates in the full regression model, showed that 
blame does not indirectly influence the relationship between free-will belief and support 
for a consequentialist response to violent crime, since the 95% bias-corrected 










5.5 Summary Tables 
 
Table 5.72 
Standardized Regression Coefficients: NFC Full Models 
 Drug Crime Property Crime Violent Crime 
  Retribution Consequentialist Retribution Consequentialist Retribution Consequentialist 
Age .09 .07 .06 -.06 .06 -.18* 
Education .05 -.02 .08 .01 .00 .05 
Political Ideology .11* -.04 .13** -.16* .02 -.20* 
Religiosity .06 -.03 .05 .03 .11* .14 
Black .06 .02 .06 .01 .05 .04 
Hispanic .04 .07 -.03 .01 .03 .05 
Asian .08 -.09 .10 -.16* .08 -.04 
Female .05 .04 .00 .04 .01 .06 
Victimized .00 .07 .03 .14* .03 .12 
NFC -.01 .14* .03 .17* -.08 .15* 
Blame .46*** .19*** .57*** .22** .67*** .07 
R2 .32 .09 .37 .16 .50 .12 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
Table 5.73 
Standardized Regression Coefficients: Race Full Models 
  Drug Crime Property Crime Violent Crime 
  Retribution Consequentialist Retribution Consequentialist Retribution Consequentialist 
Age .02 .09 .01 -.07 -.03 -.13 
Education -.07 .09 -.11* .07 -.10 .11 
Political Ideology .10 -.19** .09 -.35*** .09 -.16** 
Religiosity .07 -.05 .05 .05 .06 .11 
Black -.12* .16* -.09 .05 -.07 .11 
Hispanic .02 .09 .04 -.02 -.01 .01 
Asian .19*** -.08 .18*** -.19** .17*** -.05 
Female .11* .14* .03* .09 .05 -.04 
Victimized .07 -.03 .13 -.01 .09 -.04 
Exp. Condition .05 .02 -.01 -.02 .01 -.08 
Blame .54*** .23*** .58*** .22*** .62*** .06 
R2 .43 .15 .41 .22 .46 .07 






Standardized Regression Coefficients: FWD Full Models 
  Drug Crime Property Crime Violent Crime 
  Retribution Consequentialist Retribution Consequentialist Retribution Consequentialist 
Age .08 -.03 .02 -.01 .01 -.07 
Education .03 .00 .04 -.13* .00 -.08 
Political Ideology .13* -.24*** .07 -.36*** .04 -.26*** 
Religiosity .09 .06 -.01 .06 .02 -.01 
Black -.02 .06 .04 .09 .03 .09 
Hispanic .03 -.04 .00 -.05 -.01 .04 
Asian .00 -.01 .03 .01 .06 .06 
Female .01 .08 -.03 .07 .00 .06 
Victimized -.07 .06 .04 .10 -.01 .09 
Condition -.03 .00 -.07 -.01 -.01 -.01 
FWD -.22*** .01 -.22*** .07 -.17*** .07 
Blame .42*** .25*** .61*** .21** .70*** .01 
R2 0.41 0.13 0.55 0.21 0.63 0.11 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
Table 5.75 
Change in R2 after Including Blame in Regression Models 
 Drug Crime Property Crime Violent Crime 
  Retribution Consequentialist Retribution Consequentialist Retribution Consequentialist 
NFC studies .17 .03 .27 .03 .39 .01 
Race studies .26 .05 .31 .05 .35 .00 
Free-will doubt studies .14 .05 .27 .03 .40 .00 
 
Table 5.76 
Bootstrap Regression Coefficients: Mediation by Blame 
 Drug Crime Property Crime Violent Crime 
  Retribution Consequentialist Retribution Consequentialist Retribution Consequentialist 
NFC .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 
Race exp. condition .10 .05 .09 .04 .09 .02 
Free-will doubt  -.20* -.15* -.38* -.17* -.37* -.01 
* Significant at 95% CI 
 
5.6 Summary of Results 
 
In study 1, participants were given two rank-ordering tasks, one a series of core crimes 
and the other a series of non-core drug crimes.  On the core crime task, participants 
showed moderate agreement about how to rank the relative punishment deserved, with 
a Kendall’s coefficient of .65, falling well short of the “astounding” level found by earlier 
researchers (.95).  This was particularly surprising since participants had to rank-order 
fewer crime scenarios than in the previous study (12 compared to 24); the greater the 
number of scenarios, the more nuance for participants to disagree over.  Using the 
same points of comparison as Robinson and Kurzban, this is roughly the difference 
between the near consensus found among people ranking the comparative brightness 
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of a light (.96) (De Weert & van Kruysbergen, 1997), and the moderate agreement 
among readers of a travel magazine regarding the risk of terrorism in eight countries 
(.52) (Fischoff et al., 2004). 
There are several possible explanations for this divergence.   First, the 
participants in the earlier Robinson and Kurzban study were largely homogenous: more 
than 90% of the participants were white, more than two-thirds were women, 94% had 
attained at least a college degree, and 69% were older than 50.   Second, there were 
only 64 participants in the earlier study—a sample size considerably smaller than the 
present study, 255.  Finally, whereas in the earlier study participants completed the task 
in person (ordering cards on a table), participants in the present study completed the 
task via computer (click-and-dragging scenarios), which may have increased its 
difficulty.  That these factors diminish agreement is supported by Robinson and 
Kurzban’s own follow-up study, which was conducted via computer in a larger and more 
diverse sample than their initial study, and also yielded a lower Kendall’s W (.88).  
Given the discrepancies in these three findings, additional research is warranted.    
On the non-core drug crime task, participants showed low agreement about 
relative punishment of these crimes, with a Kendall’s coefficient of .33.  To borrow 
another point of comparison, this was even less than the agreement among economist 
about the top 10 academic journals in their field (.40) (Axarloglou & Theoharakis, 2003).  
Notably, this level of agreement for nonviolent drug offenses was considerably lower 
than that of an earlier study of garden-variety non-core crimes (.55 in person; .51 online) 
(Robinson & Kurzban, 2006).  Based on those findings, Robinson and Kurzban 
speculated that judgments about non-core crime are not the product of universal 
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“intuitions of justice,” but rather of “general social learning and reasoning.”  The current 
study lends support to the latter view, particularly regarding nonviolent drug offenses.  
Moreover, it suggests that compared to core crimes such judgments may be less 
obdurate to change. 
Study 2 examined the relationship between the NFC and support for both 
retributive and consequentialist responses to crime.  After adjusting for potential 
confounding variables (age, ethnicity, gender, education, political ideology, religiosity, 
past victimization, and blame), a statistically significant relationship was found between 
the NFC and support for a consequentialist response to all three crime types presented. 
The NFC was the second strongest predictor of support for a consequentialist response 
to drug crime and property crime (after blame); and the third strongest predictor of 
support for consequentialist response to violent crime (after political ideology and age).  
This is consistent with dual-process theory in that participants disposed to the slower, 
more deliberate ‘manual’ mode of decision-making expressed greater support for 
consequentialism; or in Sargent’s terms—more thought, less punishment.   In both the 
hierarchical regression model and bootstrapping mediation analysis, this effect proved 
not to be mediated by blame  
By contrast, there was no relationship between the NFC and support for 
retribution against any of the three crimes presented, nor was blame a significant 
mediator of the relationship.  This finding is at odds with Sargent’s earlier research 
showing an inverse relationship between the NFC and support for retribution.   
However, there were a couple of important differences between these two studies that 
may account for the inconsistent findings.  For one, the present study included a wider 
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array of control variables, which may have washed out the NFC’s effect on retributive 
attitudes.  Also, whereas in the previous study support for retribution was measured in 
the abstract, the present study asks participants to respond to specific crime scenarios. 
This would be consistent with past research showing a disparity between global and 
specific attitudes about punishment (Applegate et al., 1996).   
Study 3 examined the relationship between perception of racial disparities among 
criminal offenders and support for both retributive and consequentialist responses to 
crime.  Participants were presented with a group of criminal offenders that was either 
mostly white (experimental group) or half white (control group), and were assessed on 
support for retributive and consequentialist responses to various crime types.  There 
were no statistically significant differences between the two groups in scores on either 
the retribution or consequentialist scales.  In a follow-up study using statistical controls, 
the experimental condition again was not found to be a determinant of support for either 
a retribution or consequentialist response to crime.  
Past research showed that out-group bias, elicited through a representation of a 
mostly black offender population, increases support for retributive punishment policies.  
This supported the idea that racial bias could have the effect of switching on reasoning 
in automatic mode, thereby fueling retributive punishment.   However, the current study 
does not lend support to the opposite pathway, whereby favoritism towards racial in-
groups either diminishes support for retribution or increases support for 
consequentialism.  This relationship, though, warrants more scrutiny; possibly via an in-
person study, with a stronger manipulation, or using a measure of abstract attitudes 
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towards punishment policy rather than the specific attitudes evoked here in response to 
crime vignettes. 
Study 4 examined the relationship between free-will doubt and support for both 
retributive and consequentialist responses to crime.  Participants were exposed to either 
an essay casting doubt on the existence of free-will (experimental group) or an essay 
about consciousness unrelated to free-will (control group).  Additionally, participants 
completed a scale assessing their belief in free-will.  While there were no statistically 
significant differences in scores on the retribution and consequentialist scales, 
regression analyses demonstrated an impressive relationship between free-will doubt 
and support for retributive punishment.  After controlling for a broad range of potential 
confounding variables (age, ethnicity, gender, education, political ideology, religiosity, 
past victimization, blame), as well as any possible effect of the experimental 
manipulation, free-will doubt was found to be a strong predictor of support for retributive 
punishment in all three crime scenarios (drug crime, property crime, violent crime).  This 
is consistent with dual-process theory in that participants who expressed doubts about 
free-will—thus overriding automatic intuitions that favor free-will belief—showed less 
support for retributive punishment.  Moreover, the pattern of effects was consistent with 
Krueger et al.’s previous finding that free-will beliefs play a greater role in response to 
less emotionally arousing non-core crimes (eg., drug crime) than in the more 
emotionally arousing core crimes (eg., violent crime), albeit the difference was small.  
Finally, as predicted, this effect was partly transmitted via judgments about the amount 
of blame a perpetrator deserved, which accounted for 38% of support for retribution 
against drug crime, 56% of property crime, and 63% of violent crime.     
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In contrast, there were no statistically significant relationships between free-will 
doubt and support for consequentialist responses to crime.  Nevertheless, to the extent 
that free-will doubt influenced such judgments, it was strongly mediated by blame in the 
case of both drug crime and property crime, but not violent crime.   
Overall, this research produced several important findings.  First, with regard to 
core crimes, disagreement over the relative punishment deserved was greater than 
expected, and, with regard to nonviolent drug crime, disagreement was marked.  
Second, the need for cognition was found to be a unique determinant of support for a 
consequentialist response, with effects that were roughly similar across a broad range 
of the crime spectrum.  Third, free-will doubt was found to be a strong determinant of 
support for retribution, with effects that were roughly similar across the crime spectrum.  
In addition, a sizeable proportion of this effect was shown to be mediated by blame.  
Fourth, while small to moderate zero-order correlations were found for demographic 
variables previously shown to influence punishment decisions, when included in the 
multivariate models their effects were either washed out, or very small and inconsistent 
across the crime spectrum.  The one exception was political ideology.  In all but one of 
the models, political conservatism was found to be negatively related to support for a 
consequentialist response to crime.  Finally, as an independent variable blame was 
found to have a strong positive effect on support for retributive punishment, with 
appreciably higher effects for the core crime of violence than the non-core crime of drug 
use.  Interestingly, blame was also positively related to support for consequentialist 
responses, although the pattern of its effect was reversed: generally its strongest effect 
was on drug crime, whereas it had no effect on violent crime.  But perhaps the most 
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noteworthy aspect of blame’s effect was the amount of variation in support for 
retribution it left unexplained: it accounted for just 14-17% of the variation in support for 
drug crime; 27-31% for property crime; and 35-40% for violent crime.  Clearly, other 




CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
A public health approach to drug policy has potential to both improve public health and 
safety.  While there is evidence of public support for rehabilitation for nonviolent drug 
crime—even in the predominately conservative state of Texas (Thielo et al., 2016)—it is 
less clear whether the public will support a full shift away from punishment to public 
health, even for such low-level offenders.  If the public resists adopting a public health 
approach to drug policy, to what extent should this bear on public policy? If our 
understanding of the causes of drug crime improves, are these attitudes about 
punishment likely to change?  
The goal of this research was to conceptualize and test dual-process theory, a 
general theory of moral-decision making, as a specific theory of punishment.  Its point of 
departure was empirical desert theory, which argues for distributing punishment in 
accord with retributive intuitions, not because such feelings are correct in any empirical 
sense but because doing so is posited to prevent crime.  Yet this dissertation presents 
several challenges to this view.    
First, empirical desert theory contends that judgments about wrongdoing proceed 
along one track of cognition, intuitions, and that those intuitions favor retribution.  
However, according to dual-process theory, which accords with the state-of-the-science 
in psychology, this leaves out one-half of the punishment decision-making story.  Dual-
process theory shows that punishment decisions proceed along two distinct tracks, one 
that is largely intuitive and biased toward retribution (deontology), and a second that is 
slower, more deliberative, and biased toward rehabilitation (consequentialism).  So 
empirical deserts theory reflects only a partial understanding of the process by which 
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punishment decisions are made.  Second, empirical desert theory is predicated on 
research showing agreement among laypersons about relative blame.  Yet the current 
research raises doubts about the strength of this consensus, for both non-core crime 
and core crime.  Third, the current research questions the importance of blame in 
decisions regarding retributive punishment.  Although blame was shown to be play an 
important role in such decisions, at most it accounted for only two-fifths of the variation 
in support for retributive punishment.  Finally, while empirical desert theory allows for 
the possibility that judgments about non-core crimes may be affected by “social learning 
and reasoning,” it fails to provide an explanation of the factors that may similarly affect 
judgments about core crimes.  Instead, it posits a black box of fixed, inscrutable 
intuitions.  However, the current research shows that it is not only non-core crimes 
which are open to such influence, but also core crimes; recall that the NFC and free-will 
doubt affected judgments in all three crime scenarios: drug, property, and violent crime.    
As we have seen, dual-process theory holds out the promise of a more 
comprehensive understanding of punishment psychology.   But why focus on testing it 
on judgments about nonviolent drug crime?  For starters, from a scientific standpoint, 
the behavior underlying nonviolent drug crime is arguably the most well understood of 
all criminal behaviors.  In the last several decades, researchers have accumulated a 
large body of evidence on the causes of substance abuse, from the most granular 
biochemical factors, to the psychological, behavioral, and social.  Harnessing this 
research, a broad array of evidence-based interventions have been developed for the 
treatment of substance abuse across these various levels (eg., MAT plus behavioral 
therapy).   At the same time, the drumbeat of war has begun anew for a campaign 
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against drug crime, which in some parts of the criminal-justice system is already 
underway.  As one example, the current Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, recently 
ordered federal prosecutors to pursue the toughest possible charges and sentences 
against some nonviolent drug offenders, including mandatory minimums (Ruiz, 2017).  
Which of these divergent paths is correct? Punishment or public health?  While 
research on the psychology of punishment cannot resolve this question, it can provide 
some guidance to criminal-justice policy makers interested in reform.  For example, let 
us revisit the question posed above by Nora Volkow: “As we understand the 
neurobiological substrates that underlie voluntary actions, how will society define the 
boundaries of personal responsibility in those individuals who have impairments in 
these brain circuits?”  The current research offers several insights.  First, it suggests 
that there is marked discord over even the most basic questions concerning drug crime 
(eg., the correct rank-order of nonviolent drug offenses based on relative punishment 
deserved).  This indicates that such judgments are not so deeply intuitive or so ossified 
into social norms to be beyond change.   Second, it shows that there are various factors 
that tend to switch moral modes on or off, and thereby influence moral judgments 
regarding punishment.  One such factor is free-will doubt, which has been shown to turn 
off moral reasoning in automatic mode, decreasing support for retribution via diminished 
perceptions of blame.  Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that as doubts grow about 
whether substance abusers possess free-will over their behavior, support for 
punishment can be expected to decline.  Another factor is the need for cognition.  
Individuals with a high need for cognition have been shown to favor consequentialist 
responses to drug crime.  Although the need for cognition is a general personality trait, 
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the thought process that underlies high NFC offers a clue about how to turn on moral 
reasoning in manual mode—by relying less on others and cognitive heuristics and more 
on deliberative, effortful thought.   
Research on dual-process theory of punishment could have farther-reaching 
implications.  As new light is shed on the causes of criminal behavior—whether biological, psychological, 
or social—evidence-based interventions directed at these potential levers of change will continue to 
improve.  However, that our default moral settings tend to favor retribution raises the following concern: 
Will retributive intuitions stand in the way of the adoption of such forward-looking approaches to crime? 
The current research shows that it not just judgments about drug crime, but also crimes spanning the full 
core to non-core spectrum that are open to revision.  By further examining the factors that affect these 
judgments, and identifying others, this program of research could prove useful in overcoming this possible 




CHAPTER 7: LIMITATIONS 
The present research has several limitations.  First, research shows that samples drawn 
from the Mechanical Turk worker pool tend to skew younger, more educated, 
underemployed, less religious, and more liberal than the general population (Shapiro, D. 
N., Chandler, J., & Mueller, P. A., 2013).  That said, samples drawn from this pool tend 
to be more representative of the general population than those drawn from college 
campuses and other online sources (Paolacci, G., Chandler, J., & Ipeirotis, P. G., 2010; 
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D., 2011).  Second, it is axiomatic that 
experimental methods involve a tradeoff in causal generalization: internal validity for 
external validity.  So drawing general conclusions from these findings should be done 
with caution.  Third, disentangling deontological from consequentialist reasons is 
difficult.  Though efforts were made to isolate these rationales, it could well be that 
people indicate support for punishment partly for forward-looking reasons (eg., 
deterrence), and indicate support for rehabilitation partly for backward-looking reasons 
(eg., retribution).  Fourth, one might contend that the movement toward drug courts has 
already shifted the criminal-justice system’s focus away from retribution toward 
rehabilitation, especially for the nonviolent drug crimes portrayed in these studies.  
Although there is some merit to this argument, as noted above research shows that 
drug courts process only a small percentage of drug offenders, and with mixed results 
possibly due to their continued reliance on retribution (Alliance, D.P., 2011).  Fifth, the 
scales used to measure retribution and consequentialism are still in their early phases 
of development.  While overall they proved moderately reliable in this study, further 
research is needed.  Finally, one may wonder at the purpose of studying lay judgments 
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on punishment at all; after all, with the exception of capital cases, laypeople have little 
direct influence on decisions related to criminal-justice punishment.  However, the 
argument made by adherents of empirical desert theory—for distributing punishment in 
accord with community attitudes—has rendered lay attitudes a focal point in the 








Rank Ordering Task: 
 
Stimulus (non-core drug crimes):   
 
Instructions: Imagine you are given complete discretion to punish John for his actions in each 
of the following 12 scenarios.  Carefully order the scenarios from the LEAST amount of 
punishment (so: rank order 1 would be the least) that you think John deserves, to the MOST 
amount of punishment (so: rank order 12 would be the most) that you think he deserves.  
SCENARIO 1: 
 
John is picked up by the police after buying half a gram of powder cocaine (enough for 6 “lines”) 




John earns money as one of the only drug dealers in town selling cocaine to anyone who will 
buy.  Police raid his apartment and find 500 grams of powder cocaine (enough for about 6,000 
“lines”). 
 
SCENARIO 3:  
 
John is a cocaine importer and distributor and directs the work of a dozen dealers.  The police 
raid his home and find five kilograms of powder cocaine (enough for about 60,000 “lines”). 
SCENARIO 4: 
 
John stops by Earl’s Tavern on his way home from work, and drinks two of their infamous long 
island iced teas.  Driving home he crashes his pickup into a telephone pole in his suburban 




John is picked up by the police after buying 1/10th of an ounce (about the size of a packet of 




John earns money as one of the only drug dealers in town selling heroin to anyone who will buy.  
Police raid his apartment and find 3 ounces of heroin (enough for about 8,500 injections). 
 
SCENARIO 7:  
 
John is a heroin importer and distributor and directs the work of a dozen dealers.  The police 
raid his home and find 1 kilogram of heroin (enough for about 100,000 injections). 
 




John approaches a drug dealer and purchases enough marijuana to smoke six “bowls” for a 




John earns money as one of the only drug dealers in town selling marijuana to anyone who will 





John is picked up by the police after buying 1/20th of an ounce of crack cocaine (about the 




John is picked up by the police after buying 20 pills (4 grams) of Ecstasy for his personal use. 
 
SCENARIO 12:  
 
John manufactures methamphetamine in a lab in the garage of his home.  Police raid his 
garage and discover the lab and various chemicals involved in the process of making 
methamphetamines. 
 
Stimulus (core crimes):   
 
Imagine you are given complete discretion to punish John for his actions in each of the following 
12 scenarios.  Carefully order the scenarios from the LEAST amount of punishment (so: rank 
order 1 would be the least) that you think John deserves, to the MOST amount of punishment 
(so: rank order 12 would be the most) that you think he deserves.  
SCENARIO 1: 
 
The owner has posted rules at his all-you-can-eat buffet that expressly prohibit taking food 
away; patrons can only take what they eat at the buffet.  The owner has set the price of the 
buffet accordingly.  John purchases dinner at the buffet, but when he leaves he takes with him 




As he is walking to a party in a friend’s neighborhood, John sees a clock radio on the backseat 
of a car parked on the street.  Later that night, on his return from the party, he checks the car 
and finds it unlocked, so he takes the clock radio from the back seat. 
 
SCENARIO 3:  
 
While a family is away for the day, John breaks in through a bedroom window and rummages 
through the house looking for valuables.  He can only find an 18-inch television, which angers 
him.  When he gets it outside, he realizes that it is an older model than he wants, so he 
smashes it onto the driveway, breaking it into pieces. 
 




A record store patron is wearing a cap that mocks John’s favorite band.  John follows him from 
the store, confronts him, then slaps him in the face hard, causing him to stumble.  The man’s 




While attending a football game, John becomes angry as he overhears an opposing fan’s 
insulting remarks about John’s team.  At the end of the game, John sticks his face in the man’s 




Angry after overhearing another parent’s remarks during a soccer match in which John’s son is 
playing, John approaches the man after the game, grabs his coffee mug, knocks him down, 
then kicks him several times while he is on the ground, knocking him out for several minutes 
and causing cuts that require five stitches. 
 
SCENARIO 7:  
 
As a woman searches her purse for car keys in a mall parking lot,  John runs up and grabs her 
gold necklace but it does not break.  He yanks the woman to the ground by her necklace.  As a 




To force a man to give up his wallet during a robbery attempt, John beats the man with a club 





John is driving to see a man about buying an illegal gun but must baby-sit his friend’s toddler 
son.  It occurs to him that it is too hot to safely leave the toddler in the car but he decides to 
leave him anyway and to return soon.  He gets talking with the seller, however, and forgets 




John is offended by a woman’s mocking remark and decides to hurt her badly.  At work the next 
day, when no one else is around, he picks up a letter opener from his desk and stabs her.  She 




John knows the address of a woman who has highly offended him.  As he had planned the day 
before, he waits there for the woman to return from work and, when she appears, John shoots 






John works out a plan to kill his 60-year-old invalid mother for the inheritance; he is the sole 
beneficiary of her substantial will.  He drags her to her bed, puts her in, and lights her oxygen 
mask with a cigarette, hoping to make it look like an accident.  The elderly woman screams as 
her clothes catch fire and she burns to death.  John walks out, leaving the home as it is 




Short Form of the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) 
 
Instructions: For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the statement is 
characteristic of you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at all like you) 
please write a "1" to the left of the question; if the statement is extremely characteristic of you 
(very much like you) please write a "5" next to the question. Of course, a statement may be 
neither extremely uncharacteristic nor extremely characteristic of you; if so, please use the 
number in the middle of the scale that describes the best fit. Please keep the following scale in 
mind as you rate each of the statements below: 1 = extremely uncharacteristic; 2 = somewhat 
uncharacteristic; 3 = uncertain; 4 = somewhat characteristic; 5 = extremely characteristic.  
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.  
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to 
challenge my thinking abilities? 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in 
depth about something." 
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
7. I only think as hard as 1 have to.  
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones? 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them? 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
1 I. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much? 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat 
important but does not require much thought. 
16. 1 feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental 
effort? 
17. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works? 




Non-violent drug crime scenarios:  
 
Drug Crime 1: A person is picked up by the police after buying 2 ounces of marijuana (about the 
size of 2 zip lock bags) for his personal use. 
 
Drug Crime 2: A person is picked up by the police after buying 1/10th of an ounce of heroin 




Property crime scenarios: 
 
Property Crime 1: As he is walking to a party in a friend's neighborhood, a person sees a laptop 
computer on the back seat of a car parked on the street.  Later that night, on his return from the 
party, he checks the car and finds it unlocked, so he takes the laptop from the back seat.  Soon 
afterward, he is picked up by the police. 
 
Property Crime 2: While a family is on vacation, a person breaks in through the back door of the 
family's house and steps into the kitchen.  On the counter he sees a television, which he carries 
away.  Soon after, he is picked up by the police. 
 
Violent Crime Scenarios: 
 
Violent crime scenarios: 
 
Violent crime 1: A person is offended by a coworker's mocking remarks and decides to hurt her 
badly.  At work the next day, when no one else is around, he picks up a letter opener from his 
desk and stabs her.  She dies from the wounds.  Soon after, he is picked up by the police.    
 
Violent crime 2: A person kidnaps an 8-year old for ransom, rapes her, then records the child's 
screams as he burns her with a cigarette lighter, sending the recording to her parents to induce 
them to pay his ransom demand.  Even though they pay as directed, the person strangles the 






Instructions: For each statement below, choose a number from 1 to 7 to indicate how 
much you agree or disagree.  
1: The person described above deserves to be punished because he harmed society with his 
crime. (7-point end labeled: Strongly Disagree=1, Strongly Agree=7) 
2: The amount of punishment that the person described above receives should be equal to the 
harm caused. (7-point end labeled: Strongly Disagree=1, Strongly Agree=7) 
 
3: The amount of harm that this crime caused—and not the person described above’s 
background or why he committed the crime—should be the major factor that determines how 
long of a sentence he receives. (7-point end labeled: Strongly Disagree=1, Strongly Agree=7) 
 
4: The more serious the offense is, the more a person deserves to be punished. (7-point end 
labeled: Strongly Disagree=1, Strongly Agree=7) 
 
5: The primary purpose of our criminal-justice system is to pay back offenders for what they’ve 








Instructions: For each statement below, choose a number from 1 to 7. 
 
1: Relative to giving this offender what he deserves in terms of punishment, How important is it 
to you that the criminal-justice system rehabilitate him? (7-point end labeled: 1=Much less 
important; 7=Much more important). 
 
2: Relative to giving this offender what he deserves in terms of punishment, How important is it 
to you that the criminal-justice system reduce his risk for committing another crime in the future? 






“I speak tonight about the illusion of free will. Now most people think that we have a subjective – 
a strong subjective – experience of free will, and the problem is just that we can’t map it on to 
physical reality.  This, I think, is an illusion. I think we actually do not feel as free as we think we 
do.  This relies on us not paying very close attention to what it’s like to be us. If you pay 
attention, you can see that you no more author the next thing you think than the next thing I say.  
Thoughts just emerge in consciousness.  We are not authoring them. That would require that 
we think them before we think them.  If you can’t control your next thought and you don’t know 
what it’s going to be until it arises, Where is your freedom of will? The truth is we feel, or 
presume, an authorship over our actions and thoughts, over a certain channel of information in 
our conscious minds that is illusory.  So how can we be free as conscious agents if everything 
that we consciously intend is caused by things we did not intend and of which we are entirely 
unaware.  We can’t.  From the perspective of your conscious mind, you are actually no more 
responsible for your next thought than you are for you birth into this world.  You have not built 
your mind.  And in moments where you seem to build it – where you finally take the reins of your 
life – and decide to acquire knowledge or learn a new skill, the only tools at your disposal are 
those which you’ve inherited from moments passed. No one picks their parents, or the society to 
which they were born.  No one picks the moment in history in which they live.  No one picks 
their genes or the environmental influences that determine the structure of their brain.  You are 
no more responsible for the exact structure and state of your brain, in this moment, than you are 
for your height.  What you do based on conscious, predetermined decisions says more about 
you than anything else.  Thoughts simply arise in the mind.  But the idea that we as conscious 
beings are deeply responsible for the characters of our minds simply can’t be mapped on to 
reality.  And if we want to be guided by reality, rather than by the fantasy lives of our ancestors, I 




Neutral Condition  
 
The General Nature of Consciousness:  
  
Psychologists have shown that common sense ideas about the working of the mind can  
be misleading. When psychology began as an experimental science, in the latter part of  
the nineteenth century, there was much interest in consciousness. It was hoped that  
psychology might become more scientific by refining introspection until it became a  




Since the problem of consciousness is such a central one, and since consciousness  
appears so mysterious, one might have expected that psychologists and neuroscientists  
would now direct major efforts toward understanding it. This, however, is far from  
being the case. The majority of modern psychologists omit any mention of the problem,  
although much of what they study enters into consciousness. Most modern  
neuroscientists ignore it.  
  
The American psychologist, William James, discussed consciousness in his work ‘The  
Principles of Psychology’ (1898), and described five properties of what he called  
“thought”. Every thought, he wrote, tends to be part of personal consciousness.  
Thought is always changing, is sensibly continuous, and appears to deal with objects  
independent of itself. In addition, thought focuses on some objects to the exclusion of  
others. In other words, it involves attention. Of attention he wrote, “It is the taking  
possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several  
simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. It implies withdrawal from some  
things in order to deal effectively with others.”  
  
Many psychologists believed that some processes are subliminal or subconscious. For  
example perception was similar in its logical structure to what we normally mean by  
inference, but that it was largely unconscious. Three basic ideas of consciousness were  
developed. Firstly, not all the operations of the brain correspond to consciousness.  
Secondly, consciousness involves some form of memory, probably a very short term  
one. Thirdly, consciousness is closely associated with attention.  
  
Unfortunately, a movement arose in academic psychology that denied the usefulness of  
consciousness as a psychological concept. This was partly because experiments  
involving introspection (which involves thinking about what one is thinking) did not  
appear to be leading anywhere and partly because it was hoped that psychology could  
become more scientific by studying behavior that could be observed unambiguously by  
the experimenter. This was called the Behaviorist movement. It became taboo to talk  
about mental events. All behavior had to be explained in terms of the stimulus and the  
response.  
  
How can we approach the study of consciousness in a scientific manner? Consciousness  
takes many forms, but as I have already explained, for an initial scientific attack it  
usually pays to concentrate on the form that appears easiest to study. Christof Koch  
and I chose visual awareness rather than other forms of consciousness, such as pain or  
self-awareness, because humans are very visual animals and our visual input is  
especially vivid and rich in information. In addition, its input is often highly structured  
yet easy to control. For these reasons much experimental work has already been done  




Free Will Measure (FAD-Plus) (Paulhus & Carey, 2010). 
 
Instructions: For each statement below, choose a number from 1 to 5 to indicate how much 
you agree or disagree. 
 
1: People have complete control over the decisions they make. (5-point end labeled: 1=Strongly 
Disagree; 5=Strongly Agree) 
118 
 
2: People must take full responsibility for any bad choices they make. (5-point end labeled: 
1=Strongly Disagree; 5=Strongly Agree) 
3: People can overcome any obstacles if they truly want to. (5-point end labeled: 1=Strongly 
Disagree; 5=Strongly Agree) 
4: Criminals are totally responsible for the bad things they do. (5-point end labeled: 1=Strongly 
Disagree; 5=Strongly Agree) 
5: People have complete free will. (5-point end labeled: 1=Strongly Disagree; 5=Strongly Agree) 
6: People are always at fault for their bad behavior. (5-point end labeled: 1=Strongly Disagree; 
5=Strongly Agree) 
7: Strength of mind can always overcome the body's desires. (5-point end labeled: 1=Strongly 
Disagree; 5=Strongly Agree) 
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